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Abstract
I revisit Fazzari et al. (1988) seminal paper on the investment-cash flow sensitivity as a measure of financing constraints and
augment their approach with the findings from recent papers. I find that the investment-cash flow sensitivity has decreased and
mostly disappeared over time, in line with recent literature. This finding is robust to alternative specifications and a number
of robustness checks. I contribute to the literature by explicitly analyzing the strict-exogeneity assumption of the fixed-effects
and first-differences estimators in empirical practice. In this setting, strict exogeneity does not hold and the violation can
cause substantial inconsistencies.
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1. Introduction
Many empirical business investment models have relied
and still generally rely on the assumption that there is a “rep-
resentative firm.” This firm responds to prices set in central-
ized security markets. For this firm, only its cost of capital
and investment demand affect investment spending. Its fi-
nancial structure, for example, is irrelevant to investment,
given that internal and external finance are perfect substi-
tutes. So, generally, when capital markets are perfect, this
firm’s investment decisions are independent of its financial
condition. However, an alternative research stream has been
focusing on the view that there is a wedge between the in-
ternal and external cost of finance – a firm is then said to be
financially constrained (Fazzari et al. (1988) (FHP), p. 141).
This definition provides a useful framework to differentiate
firms according to the extent to which they are financially
constrained (Kaplan and Zingales (1997), p. 172). (A firm is
considered more financially constrained as the gap between
its cost of internal and external funds widens.)
Following this research, a firm’s investment may also de-
pend on financial factors, such as the availability of internal
finance and access to new debt or equity finance. For exam-
ple, a firm’s internal cash flow may affect investment spend-
ing because of a financing hierarchy, in which internal funds
have a cost advantage over external funds. Thus, a firm’s sen-
sitivity of (physical) investment to cash flow has often been
used in the empirical literature as a measure of capital con-
straints. The underlying logic is that if firms could easily ac-
cess external capital, there would be no need to alter invest-
ment due to shocks to cash flow. As a result, there would
be no significant relation between cash flow and investment
(Gatchev et al. (2010)).
Conventional representative firm models, in which the fi-
nancial structure is irrelevant to the investment decision, are
likely to be suitable for mature firms, whose prospects are
well known. However, for other firms, financial factors might
– even today – matter in the sense that, especially in the
short run, internal and external funds are imperfect substi-
tutes. For these firms, the availability of internally generated
funds may have an effect on investment decisions (Fazzari
et al. (1988), p. 142). A main foundation for such a capi-
tal market imperfection is the presence of information asym-
metries. This makes it very costly for providers of external
finance to evaluate the quality of firms’ investment oppor-
tunities. Theoretical arguments that support this view draw
heavily from the “lemons” problem first considered by Ak-
erlof (1970). Akerlof argues that some sellers with inside
information about the quality of an asset or a security may
be unwilling to accept the terms offered by a less-informed
buyer. This can cause the breakdown of the market; at least,
this can lead to the sale of an asset at a price that is lower
than it would be if all parties had full information. This ar-
gument can be applied to the example of new share issues,
as suggested by Myers and Majluf (1984), in cases in which
managers have inside information. If this information is fa-
vorable, it may happen that management, acting in the in-
terest of existing shareholders, does not issue new shares, as
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these would be underpriced. Knowing about this asymmet-
ric information problem, investors might generally interpret
management’s decision to issue new shares as a signal that
shares are overpriced. In this case, given the adverse selec-
tion problem, new equity finance can only be obtained at a
premium (Devereux and Schiantarelli (1990), p. 282).
Agency costs might also give ground to capital con-
straints. Conflicts between shareholders and debtholders
can lead to agency costs of debt. When a company is partly
financed with debt, Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest
that stockholders have an incentive to engage in projects
that would otherwise be too risky, thereby increasing the
probability of financial distress. If the project is successful,
the payoff to the firm owners is large. However, if unsuccess-
ful, the limited liability provision of debt contracts stipulates
that it is the creditors who bear most of the costs. On top of
that, Myers (1977) suggests that in these cases, in which a
firm is partly debt financed, it may underinvest in the sense
that it forgoes projects with a positive net present value.
Provided that potential creditors understand the incentives
of stockholders and incorporate the risk of bankruptcy in
loan negotiations, the company owners ultimately bear the
consequences of these agency problems in terms of a higher
cost of debt (Devereux and Schiantarelli (1990), p. 280).
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the possible
divergence of interest between managers and outside share-
holders can give rise to agency costs of equity. In case of a
separation between ownership and control, managers are en-
couraged to use a greater than optimal amount of the firm’s
resources in the form of perquisites. Though such activities
can be monitored by outside shareholders, doing so is costly.
Ultimately, it is again the owners who have to bear the costs in
terms of a reduced price that prospective outside sharehold-
ers are willing to pay for a stake in the firm. Marris (1964)
growth model is also based on the divergence of interest be-
tween managers and outside shareholders. Marris shows that
managers may wish to increase the growth rate of their com-
pany beyond the level that maximizes shareholder wealth.
They do so while they try to maintain the company’s share
price at a sufficiently high level to avoid a takeover by out-
siders, who would then be likely to dismiss the managers.
Finally, capital market imperfections causing capital con-
straints can exist due to transaction costs. For example,
investment-banking fees must be paid when raising exter-
nal finance (Duesenberry (1958)). Implications arise for
the study of macroeconomic investment fluctuations and the
impact of public policy on capital spending in the case that
capital market imperfections still exist. These capital market
imperfections lead to binding financial constraints on invest-
ment. Financial constraints in capital markets could then
magnify the macroeconomic effect of shocks to cash flow or
cash stock on aggregate investment. With regards to tax pol-
icy, in case of frictionless financial markets, only the marginal
tax rate on returns from a new project matter. However, for
firms that face imperfect markets for external finance, the
amount of earnings devoted to taxes – and therefore the av-
erage tax rate on returns from existing projects – matters for
investment, possibly along with incentive effects of marginal
tax rates (Fazzari et al. (1988), pp. 184–186).
Several recent studies have shown that the investment-
cash flow sensitivity has decreased over time. There are sev-
eral reasons to suspect why this is the case. One important
reason is the substantial development in US equity markets
over the last decades. For example, in 1971, young firms got
access to a much more efficient stock exchange when Nasdaq
was created. This is underlined by a steep increase in pub-
lic equity finance use by young firms suggesting that stock
issues may have become a closer substitute for internal fi-
nance. The second reason is closely related to that. It is the
sharp increase in the fraction of publicly traded firms that
consistently present negative cash flow figures. When cash
flow is particularly low, these firms often make heavy use
of public equity to expand investment. Hence, a failure to
account for external finance in investment-cash flow regres-
sions can result in a downward omitted variable bias in the
estimated cash-flow coefficient. For example, cash flow goes
down, causing external finance to go up, which then finances
investment. A third reason is the change in the composition
of total investment. Research and development (R& D) in-
tensity has risen strongly for the typical manufacturing firm,
while the absolute and relative importance of physical invest-
ment has deteriorated. Given that most investment-cash flow
studies have so far focused on physical investment, its de-
clining relative importance has potentially led to a decline in
the conventionally measured investment-cash flow sensitiv-
ity (Brown and Petersen (2009)).
In this research paper, I revisit the very early literature
on investment-cash flow sensitivity as a measure of financing
constraints and see what has changed. Concretely, I use Faz-
zari et al. (1988) partially as a guidance and comparison. I
augment this with the findings from influential, recent papers
in the literature (e.g., regarding the changing composition of
investment). Inter alia and naturally, this implies that I in-
vestigate whether the sensitivity of investment to cash flow
has reduced over time.
Throughout the paper, I put a great focus on the econo-
metrics involved (e.g., careful selection of the estimation
method). Noteworthy, this is one of the first papers to ex-
plicitly acknowledge and analyze the strict exogeneity as-
sumption of the fixed-effects and first- differences estimator
in empirical practice. Apart from the typical notion of con-
temporaneous exogeneity, which only requires a lack of con-
temporaneous correlation between the error term and the
explanatory variables, strict exogeneity requires the absence
of feedback from the dependent variable to future values of
the independent variable. So far, the overwhelming majority
of panel-data finance literature does not explicitly account
for the strict exogeneity. To overcome this weakness, I par-
tially follow the approach in Grieser and Hadlock (2015).
They show not only that it is highly likely that the strict ex-
ogeneity assumption is quite commonly violated in practice,
but also that, in many instances, the possible magnitude of
the inference errors is substantial. Given that I pay explicit
attention to this assumption and that practical, empirical
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evidence is still rare, credibility of my general results is in-
creased, plus I can offer additional evidence on the topic of
strict exogeneity in empirical practice.
I test the following hypotheses: a) in the investment-cash
flow regression, the coefficient on cash flow is still positive
on average, b) the coefficient is still significantly larger for
companies a priori assigned into the more financially con-
strained sub-sample, c) the investment-cash flow sensitivity
has decreased over time, d) fixed effects (FE) is the most ap-
propriate estimation method for this research question, e)
the strict exogeneity assumption is generally violated, and f)
there is evidence that the inconsistency caused by violation of
strict exogeneity can be substantial. My main findings indi-
cate that the investment-cash flow sensitivity has decreased
and (mostly) disappeared over time. This finding is robust to
alternative specifications and a number of robustness checks.
Also, the usage of different estimation methods does not sig-
nificantly alter the main findings, while FE seems to be the
most suitable estimation method; however, the choice of the
estimation method can have a substantial effect on the esti-
mation results. Furthermore, in this setting, strict exogeneity
does not seem to hold and the inconsistency caused by this
can be substantial.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
2 scans the relevant literature, divided into chapters on the
influential early papers, more recently written papers, and
papers written on common application errors of estimation
methods on panel data. Section 3 describes the data and the
classification scheme applied to the data. Section 4 presents
the models used in this thesis, specified as market-to-book
and sales accelerator models of investment. Section 5 cov-
ers the relevant estimation methods employed, as well as ex-
planations of the strict exogeneity test and the impact of a
violation of the strict exogeneity assumption. Section 6 ad-
dresses the topic of standard errors, including a discussion of
appropriate clustering. Section 7 presents the results, com-
pares these to Fazzari et al. (1988), analyses differences of
estimates based on the respective estimation methods, draws
inferences based on the strict exogeneity tests, and explores
whether the general findings hold in a number of robustness
checks. Section 8 concludes, discusses this paper’s contri-
butions and drawbacks, and outlines possibilities for future
research.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Early Investment Literature
In the post-war period, investment research, especially
the work of Meyer and Kuh (1957), examined the impor-
tance of financial considerations in business investment deci-
sions. In general, established by the “debt inflation” school,
financial effects on various facets of real economic activity
received much attention. However, starting in the 1960s, re-
search mostly isolated real firm decisions from purely finan-
cial factors. The theoretical basis was laid by Modigliani and
Miller (1958) who demonstrated that, under certain condi-
tions, financial structure and financial policy are irrelevant
for real investment. According to them, a firm’s financial
structure does not affect its market value in perfect capital
markets. If the assumptions put forward in their work are sat-
isfied, real firm decisions, motivated by the maximization of
shareholder value, are independent of financial factors such
as a firm’s liquidity, debt leverage, and dividend payments.
Fazzari et al. (1988) relate the traditional study of fi-
nancial effects on investment to a recent literature on cap-
ital market imperfections by studying investment behavior
in groups of firms with different financial characteristics.
Their article was a starting point for a number of studies
that show that investment is more sensitive to cash flow
for firms that are a priori classified to be more financially
constrained. FHP’s findings are based on a sample that com-
prises manufacturing firms with positive sales growth from
1969–1984. The size of the cash flow coefficients is generally
large, ranging from approximately 0.2 for the unconstrained
sub-sample of firms to 0.6 for the constrained sub-sample.
They test for the accelerator, neoclassical, and q models of
investment, with q being the main specification. A simple
cash flow model stresses only the cost of capital side. This is
of crucial importance, however, given that it may capture the
wedge between the internal and external costs of finance and
given that internal finance in the form of retained earnings
generates the majority of the net funds for firms in all size
categories.
The simple accelerator model stresses the demand for the
capital side of the investment decision. The neoclassical the-
ory incorporates the principle of the accelerator model by
making investment a function of output and lagged capital
stock. However, it differs from the accelerator model by addi-
tionally making investment dependent on product price and
idiosyncratic cost of capital. For the purposes of this paper,
it is sufficient to use – besides a q measure – the accelerator
model, as both theories, accelerator and neoclassic, make to-
day’s investment a function of today’s output. The q theory
of investment incorporates the basic assumptions and con-
ditions of the neoclassical model. Under these, differences
in q across firms reflect differences in desired capital stocks
relative to actual capital stocks. Thereby, these differences
should explain differences in investment, without actually
having to measure the cost of capital of individual firms. Faz-
zari et al. (1988) invoke transaction costs, tax advantages,
agency problems, costs of financial distress, and (especially)
asymmetric information as reasons for internal and external
finance not being perfect substitutes in practice. They argue
that if the cost of capital differs by the source of funds, the
availability of finance will likely have an effect on the invest-
ment practice of some firms. In financing hierarchy models,
the availability of internal funds allows firms to undertake
desirable investment projects without the need to resort to
high-cost external finance.
Devereux and Schiantarelli (1990) have written an influ-
ential paper whose findings are in line with those presented
in Fazzari et al. (1988). They provide empirical evidence on
the impact of financial factors like cash flow, debt, and stock
measures of liquidity on the investment decisions of 720 U.K.
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manufacturing firms. These firms are split by size, age, and
type of industry (growing or declining) – as proxies for the
degree of financing constraints – over the period 1969–1986.
This classification scheme is different to those employed in
most of the other early papers in the field, such as Fazzari
et al. (1988), Gertler and Hubbard (1988), and Hoshi et al.
(1991), which use “broad” proxies for financing constraints
like the dividend-payout ratio. Apart from that, while the ap-
proach in Devereux and Schiantarelli (1990) is very similar
to the one in Fazzari et al. (1988), the explanatory variables
are introduced via a different, more comprehensive extension
of the q model of investment. The model explicitly includes
a term representing agency costs. This agency cost function
is expected to vary for firms in different age and size classes
and in different industries. The model also includes lagged
values of the dependent variable and of each regressor to al-
low for the possibility of an innovation error that follows a
first-order autoregressive process. The model is – contrary to
the common approach in the literature – estimated in first dif-
ferences to allow for firm-specific, time-invariant effects and
an instrumental variables procedure is used to allow for en-
dogeneity of the regressors. (Endogeneity can arise because
current cash flow, debt, current assets, Q , and investment
may all be simultaneously determined.)
Like in Fazzari et al. (1988), the econometric results in-
dicate that financial factors, principally in the form of lagged
cash flow, have an independent effect on investment. The
size of the effect is, however, smaller than in Fazzari et al.
(1988), ranging from around 0.05–0.25. Cash flow has a
(slightly) higher coefficient in the small, young firm sub- sam-
ple than in the small, mature firm sub-sample, as one expects
when the market learns to evaluate investment opportunities
better with time. Moreover, as outlined in Titman and Wes-
sels (1988), smaller firms regularly tend to be less diversified,
to display greater earnings volatility, and to be more prone to
bankruptcy. In contrast to that, since size may proxy for (a
diversified) ownership structure, in which agency problems
can be more pronounced, there is some ambiguity in assess-
ing the effect of size on agency cost. Hence, the authors use
these agency costs arising from large firms’ diversified own-
ership base to explain the magnitude of the impact of cash
flow on investment, which is larger for large firms than for
small firms.
Hoshi et al. (1991) is another well-known study that in-
terprets a greater investment-cash flow sensitivity of firms,
which are a priori considered to be more likely to face a larger
wedge between the internal and external cost of funds, as
evidence that these firms are indeed financially constrained.
The authors work with a panel data sub-set of Japanese man-
ufacturing firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange between
1965 and 1986. These firms are divided on the basis whether
they belong to a keiretsu and, thus, to a large extent whether
they have a main-bank relationship. This scheme is based
on the theories by Myers and Majluf (1984), who suggest
a positive role for a main-bank relationship in reducing in-
formational asymmetries and, thus, in alleviating financing
constraints. Stressing these theories, the authors interpret
their findings, namely that Japanese firms with an exclusive
bank relationship have a lower investment-cash flow sensitiv-
ity, as evidence that a main-bank relationship reduces finan-
cial constraints. However, this interpretation is questioned by
the theory of Sharpe (1990), among others. Sharpe argues
that banks can exploit an exclusive main-bank relationship
and make client firms more constrained by charging them a
higher cost of capital. The finding in Hoshi et al. (1991) that
the financially strongest Japanese firms subsequently broke
their bank relationship is consistent with this interpretation.
This theoretical ambiguity is not unique to this paper.
Blanchard et al. (1994) analyze what firms do with cash
windfalls, which do not change their investment opportunity
set, that is, their marginal Tobin’s q. The authors’ sample is
comprised of eleven firms with such windfalls in the form
of a won or settled lawsuit during 1980–1986. This sam-
ple includes firms without attractive investment opportuni-
ties. Nevertheless, the managers of these firms choose to
keep the cash windfall in the firm rather than distribute it
to the shareholder. If anything, they typically borrow more
after the windfall. Like in Fazzari et al. (1988), this evi-
dence is broadly inconsistent with the perfect capital markets
model; rather it supports the agency model of managerial
behavior, in which managers try to ensure the long-term sur-
vival and independence of the firms with themselves as the
commander-in-chief.
In Lamont (1997), data from the 1986 oil price decrease
are used to examine physical investment of oil companies’
non-oil subsidiaries. The 1986 oil shock, during which oil
prices fell by 50 percent, is argued to be an unambiguously
exogenous shock to any individual firm. Lamont identi-
fies a group of firms that have corporate segments in the
oil extraction industry and in non-oil industries and tests
whether a decrease in cash/collateral decreases investment
and whether the finance costs of different parts of the same
corporation are interdependent. Similar to Blanchard et al.
(1994), the profitability of investment opportunities is not
impacted. This is because marginal q in corporate segments
in the non-oil industries is uncorrelated with marginal q in
the oil extraction industry. Results in Lamont (1997) support
the hypotheses: oil companies significantly reduced their
non-oil investment compared to the median industry invest-
ment. Though the sample size is fairly small, the results
appear to be moderately robust. This is interpreted as ex-
ternal capital markets being imperfect (i.e., financial slack
matters for investment) and as internal capital markets al-
locating capital within firms (i.e., different parts of the firm
are interdependent).
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) is the first influential study
to oppose the findings in Fazzari et al. (1988) and in the
follow-up literature. Kaplan and Zingales are agnostic on
what source of capital market imperfection causes financing
constraints. Unlike Blanchard et al. (1994), the authors’ goal
is to understand the effects capital market imperfections have
on investment. For that, they investigate the relationship be-
tween financing constraints and investment-cash flow sensi-
tivities by analyzing the 49 low-dividend-firms identified in
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Fazzari et al. (1988). Their approach is to examine each of
the 49 firms’ annual reports for each sample year, and read
the management’s discussion of liquidity that describes the
firm’s future needs of funds and sources it plans to use to
meet those needs. Kaplan and Zingales integrate this infor-
mation with quantitative data and public news in order to
retrieve a comprehensive picture of the availability of funds
for each firm, as well as each firm’s demand for funds. Based
on that, they rank the extent to which the sample firms are
financially constrained each year. According to that, in only
15 percent of firm-years there is some question as to a firm’s
ability to access internal or external funds to finance invest-
ment. They present theoretical and empirical evidence that a
greater sensitivity of investment to cash flow is not a reliable
measure of the differential cost between internal and exter-
nal finance. This evidence holds for the entire sample period,
sub-periods, and individual years.
Cleary (1999) confirms the findings in Kaplan and Zin-
gales (1997) using, with 1,080 firms, a much larger sample
over the period 1991–1994. In fact, in his doctoral thesis,
he finds that investment-cash flow sensitivities are actually
inversely related to constraints – the most constrained firms
have the lowest sensitivities and the least constrained firms
have the highest sensitivities. However, the size of the sensi-
tivities is only around 0.1–0.2, while Kaplan and Zingales re-
port estimates of around 0.3–0.6, potentially indicating that
sensitivities have decreased over time. In the early papers
in this literature stream, it is fairly standard to sort firms ac-
cording to within-sample characteristics, such as in Fazzari
et al. (1988) and Hoshi et al. (1991). As this approach has
received a number of criticisms, Kaplan and Zingales (1997),
as well as Cleary (1999), address this concern by defining a
company’s financial status in a way that reflects only past (not
future) information.
2.2. Recent Investement Literature
Despite – and probably also because of – controversy in
the investment-cash flow literature, many studies still ana-
lyze and use investment-cash flow sensitivity. ? use data from
1985–2001 to examine the investment-cash flow sensitivity
of US manufacturing firms in relation to five factors that they
associate with capital market imperfections. They are one of
the first to explicitly analyze and find a steady decline in the
estimated sensitivity over time. The overall evidence sug-
gests that the sensitivity of investment to cash flow decreases
with factors that reduce capital market imperfections. This
implies that the sensitivity of investments to the availability
of internal funds cannot be explained solely as an artifact of
measurement error – which has often been used in the more
recent literature to explain a positive sensitivity, especially
related to the M/B measure employed.
A paper by Brown and Petersen (2009) follows ?, but
lays a greater emphasis on the impact of the changing com-
position of investment and of developments in equity mar-
kets on the sensitivity. Brown and Petersen cover the pe-
riod 1970–2006, split into three sub- periods. They split
firms into young and mature. The standard OLS fixed ef-
fects model used in the investment-cash flow literature is em-
ployed, though the paper’s main results are based on dynamic
investment regressions using general methods of moments
(GMM), where cash flow and other financial variables are
treated as endogenous. Sensitivity of investment to cash flow
largely disappears for physical investment, remains relatively
strong for R& D, and substantially declines for total invest-
ment. The GMM regressions that control for negative cash
flow and include measures of external finance show a de-
cline in the sensitivity of at least 70 percent over 1970–1981
and 1994–2006, largely explained by the decrease in impor-
tance of tangible investment relative to total investment. The
empirical strategy in Brown and Petersen (2009) is motivated
by a number of papers that criticize conventional investment-
cash flow regressions, especially when these do not control
for the potential endogeneity of cash flow and when the pos-
sible importance of external finance is neglected.
Criticism of the methodology in the standard investment-
cash flow literature is also the motivation of a study written
by Gatchev et al. (2010), who develop a dynamic multi- equa-
tion model where firms make financing and investment de-
cisions simultaneously, subject to the constraint that sources
must equal uses of cash. They argue that static models of
financial decisions – as mostly employed in the literature –
produce inconsistent coefficient estimates, and that models
that do not acknowledge the interdependence among de-
cision variables produce inefficient estimates. The authors
work with annual data, which exclude financial institutions
and utilities, spanning the period 1950–2007. When they use
a standard single-equation approach, the coefficient on cash
flow has a size of 0.47 – as substantial as in the papers by
Fazzari et al. (1988) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997). How-
ever, using their system-of-equations model, estimates are in
many specifications indistinguishable from zero. This differ-
ence in coefficient estimates basically stems from the inclu-
sion of lagged capital expenditures (CapEx) in the system-
of-equations model. This suggests that failing to account
for persistence can lead to biased results. The system-of-
equations approach examines capital constraints comprehen-
sively by allowing indirect (investment-cash flow) and di-
rect (financing-cash flow) effects to be studied simultane-
ously. Compared to the static single-equation methodology,
the multivariate model produces substantially smaller esti-
mates of the investment-cash flow sensitivity and makes clear
that the sensitivity to cash flow of financing dominates over
investment. This makes clear that firms absorb cash-flow
fluctuations mainly by altering net debt – and not by chang-
ing real assets. That is, they decrease leverage and basically
do not invest. In addition to that, unlike the static single-
equation studies that find that firms underinvest given cash-
flow shortfalls, Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan conclude that
firms maintain investment by borrowing.
Chen and Chen (2012) try to settle the debate on the in-
terpretation of investment-cash flow sensitivity as a measure
of financial constraints. They find that the investment-cash
flow sensitivity has declined and disappeared, even during
P. Schnorpfeil / Junior Management Science 2(1), 2017, 17-4822
the 2007–2009 credit crunch. The results are robust to con-
siderations of R& D and cash reserves, and across groups of
firms. Though the information content in cash flow regarding
investment opportunities has declined, measurement error in
Tobin’s q cannot completely explain the patterns in the sen-
sitivity. Decline and disappearance can neither be explained
by changes in sample composition, corporate governance, or
market power. The authors show that the investment-cash
flow sensitivity is about 0.3 in the 1960s. Since 1997, it has
been below 0.03. It has disappeared in manufacturing, as
well as non-manufacturing firms. These findings are robust
to alternative model specifications.
Like in Blanchard et al. (1994) and Lamont (1997), An-
drén and Jankensgård (2015) use an exogenous shock as
a basis for their study. They are the first to bring evidence
from some kind of natural experiment in which there was an
unexpected, substantial, and persistent decrease in the cost
of external financing: the sudden abundance of liquidity in
the oil and gas industry in the mid 2000s. This abundance
was triggered by high oil prices and an eased access to ex-
ternal financing, and the authors look at its influence on the
investment-cash flow relationship. For that, they use a bal-
anced sample of 78 firms, rendering 612 firm-year observa-
tions. Firm size is the splitting criterion for classifying firms
as constrained or unconstrained. By carrying out regressions
of investment on Tobin’s q and financial variables (cash flow,
cash, and leverage), the authors use the standard method-
ology in the literature. They find that, for financially con-
strained firms, the investment-cash flow sensitivity decreased
in the abundance period (2005–2008), suggesting that the
financial constraints became less binding. Instead, for finan-
cially unconstrained firms, the sensitivity increases over time,
suggesting that this relationship is driven by agency problems
related to free cash flow. Hence, this paper’s results are partly
at odds with findings in other recent papers, such as Brown
and Petersen (2009), who find that the investment-cash flow
sensitivity has decreased over time due to capital market im-
provements. Andrén and Jankensgard verify the differential
role of cash flow to investment across systematically different
types of firms, even in a recent period (2000–2008).
Chowdhury et al. (2016) try to mitigate some of the
conceptual and methodological problems brought up in the
investment-cash flow literature by using a research design
that relates changes in the sensitivity to changes in infor-
mation asymmetries. The bid-ask spread surrounding the
implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act (2002)
and the deregulation of firms in the transportation, telecom-
munication, and petroleum and natural gas industries (end
of 1970s) serves as a measure of information asymmetry. The
authors base their paper on the idea in Cleary et al. (2007)
that two firms, ceteris paribus, may face differently severe
problems of information asymmetry. Cleary et al. (2007)
predict that the investment-cash flow sensitivity is unam-
biguously higher the greater the asymmetry of information.
Chowdhury et al. (2016) find that information asymmetry
decreases following SOX and that there is a correspond-
ing decrease in the sensitivity, pre- to post- SOX. Greater
decreases in information asymmetry following SOX are asso-
ciated with greater decreases in the sensitivity of investment
to cash flow. They also detect an increase in information
asymmetry with a corresponding increase in the sensitivity
following deregulation.
Other relatively recent studies examine the presence of
financial market frictions. For that, they analyze the connec-
tion between changes in the values of pledgeable assets and
financing. These tests generally produce evidence that finan-
cially weak firms face difficulties in raising funds through eq-
uity or debt markets. For example, Rauh (2006) finds that
CapEx decline with mandatory contributions to defined ben-
efit pension plans. Also, Almeida and Campello (2007) find
that sensitivity of investment to cash flow increases – in the
case of financially constrained firms – in the tangibility of as-
sets. Hence, they conclude that financing frictions influence
investment decisions. Another influential example showing
that the topic of financing constraints is broadened beyond
investment-cash flow sensitivities is the forthcoming paper
in The Accounting Review by Linck et al. (2013). They hy-
pothesize that a financially constrained firm with valuable
projects can use discretionary accruals to credibly signal pos-
itive prospects, thus easing the possibility to raise capital to
make the investments. To test the hypothesis, the authors
use panel data for 1987–2009. They find, inter alia, that fi-
nancially constrained firms with good investment opportu-
nities have significantly higher discretionary accruals prior
to investment compared to their unconstrained counterparts.
Their results support evidence that the use of discretionary
accruals can help promising firms suffering from financing
constraints to ease those constraints and increase firm value.
2.3. Application Errors of Estimation Methods on Panel Data
A couple of important papers have recently been written
on common application errors in the finance literature of the
fixed-effects estimator on panel data (Grieser and Hadlock
(2015), p. 1). For example, Gormley and Matsa (2014) dis-
cuss the limitations of two widely used approaches in finance
research: demeaning the dependent variable with respect to
the group (e.g., industry-adjusting) and adding the mean of
the group’s dependent variable as a control. Both methods
produce inconsistent estimates, thereby distorting inference.
As an alternative, the FE estimator is consistent and should
therefore be used.
Petersen (2009) examines the different methods used in
the literature to work around the problem that, in panel data
sets, the residuals may be correlated across firms or across
time. Thompson (2011) writes that it is common practice,
when estimating finance panel regressions, to adjust the stan-
dard errors for correlation either across firms, or across time.
These procedures are only valid if the residuals are not cor-
related across time and firms. Thompson shows that it is
easy to calculate standard errors that are robust to simulta-
neous correlation along two dimensions, such as firms and
time. Both Petersen (2009) and Thompson (2011) highlight
that researchers do not use the appropriate standard errors
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to adjust for the types of error variance and covariance struc-
tures that are common in finance settings. This recent liter-
ature does not emphasize the strict exogeneity assumption
that must hold for the FE estimator or its cousin, the first-
difference (FD) estimator, in order to have a chance to con-
sistently estimate the coefficients of interest. It is already
a cursory consideration of the variables used in finance re-
search that suggests that this assumption will often be vio-
lated. Many of the relevant dependent variables to financial
economists are likely to be related to the subsequent evolu-
tion of the key explanatory variables. In Strebulaev et al.
(2012), as well as in other papers, dynamic theoretical mod-
els posit exactly this feedback that will lead to violation of
the assumption.
The work by Wintoki et al. (2012) is the first exception
in that it acknowledges the strict exogeneity issue in a panel
data finance model that does not include a lagged depen-
dent variable. (As the inclusion of a lagged dependent vari-
able in any panel data analysis structurally violates strict ex-
ogeneity in the underlying model, there is no need to test
for it anymore.) Wintoki, Linck, and Netter highlight the im-
portance of strict exogeneity in the setting of the effect of
board structure on firm performance. They question prior
work on this issue that relies on (probably) inconsistent FE
or FD estimators when the authors reject the validity of the
strict exogeneity assumption. A paper by Grieser and Had-
lock (2015) is similar in many ways to Wintoki et al. (2012).
However, by examining the strict exogeneity assumption in a
set of canonical panel-data regression models selected from
the existing finance literature, the paper does not restrict at-
tention to one specific research context, but highlights that
this issue applies to a large set of empirical models in fi-
nance. The work by Grieser and Hadlock (2015) serves as
a basis and guidance for the analysis of the strict exogeneity
assumption in this thesis. The authors use the entire uni-
verse of available Compustat data (excluding financials and
utilities) from 1965–2012. They search through every issue
of the Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics,
and Review of Financial Studies over the period 2006–2013.
They categorize each paper that features an empirical model
with unit-level (e.g., firm, bank, person) fixed effects rather
than solely time (e.g., year, quarter) effects into traditional
FE estimates (most often used), traditional FD estimates, or
dynamic panel GMM estimates. Each categorized panel data
study is then assigned into a broad set of mutually exclusive
categories based on the employed dependent variables (in-
ter alia, leverage) and corresponding relevant independent
variables (inter alia, return on assets). That way, the authors
work out the five dependent variables that are used most fre-
quently in the literature.
Based on Wooldridge (2010), for every model created,
it is tested whether the strict exogeneity assumption holds
and explored whether failures in the assumption are proba-
ble to lead to substantial inconsistencies in the common es-
timators. In the paper, it becomes evident that the strict ex-
ogeneity assumption is quite frequently violated; it can even
be rejected in virtually all of the canonical regression mod-
els considered by the authors when large samples are used.
In addition to that, the inconsistency caused by the viola-
tion can have a significant effect on economic inferences in
finance settings. The problem of the inconsistency in the FE
estimator is known to be around 1/T, where T denotes the
number of time periods. (The inconsistency in the FD es-
timator does not depend on T.) 1/T requires the presence
of stable, i.e., time-invariant, fixed effects. Demonstrating
that in common finance panel settings unit-level fixed effects
seem to change over time, the authors show that it appears
unlikely that the 1/T results will solve the problem – pro-
vided that a large number of time periods is actually avail-
able. Also, differences between the FE and FD estimates are
regularly in the order of 50 percent or higher. Using these
differences to gauge the possible magnitude of inference er-
rors, a substantial economic impact of basing inferences on
inconsistent estimates is not unlikely. Based on the evidence
presented, Grieser and Hadlock (2015) indicate that simple
FE or FD panel data estimators are in many cases not the
correct tools to use in settings that include the presence of
unit-level fixed effects – and they offer a serious challenge to
empirical finance research.
Overall, this literature review makes clear, among other
things, that a) the investment- cash flow sensitivity has de-
creased over time, b) a number of papers criticize the in-
terpretation of the sensitivity as a measure of financial con-
straints (e.g., an increase in sensitivity cannot be seen as an
increase in financing constraints), c) a number of recent pa-
pers criticize conventional investment-cash flow regressions
(e.g., for neglecting the possibility of impact of external fi-
nance), d) the topic of financing constraints and investment-
cash flow sensitivity constitutes one of the largest literature
streams in corporate finance and is still a vivid research field,
and e) testing for violation of the strict exogeneity assump-
tion is of importance. This paper adds value to a line of re-
search that is of ongoing interest. It basically uses the struc-
ture in Fazzari et al. (1988) – the parent of all papers on this
topic –, analyzes what has changed (e.g., decrease in sensi-
tivity over time), puts a greater focus on the econometrics in-
volved (e.g., analyses of estimation methods, strict exogene-
ity assumption, and standard errors), and adds some of the
more important findings in the recent literature to the thesis
(e.g., changing composition of investment, impact of exter-
nal finance).
3. Sample
The sample in this study consists of US industrial firms
between 1990 and 2015. Data is obtained from Compus-
tat. The sample period covers two times of crises and three
waves of corporate investment. The first crisis happened
after the burst of the dot-com bubble, which climaxed in
2000. The second crisis was the global financial crisis of
2007–2008. The first wave of corporate investment was
related to the dot-com splurge of 1997–2001. Cash was
poured into building cell-phone networks and the Internet’s
backbone. From 2003–2010, there was an emerging-market
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frenzy, with Western firms investing about $ 2 trillion in
factories and other facilities in places like China and India.
Finally, also driven by insatiable Chinese demand, there was
a craze for commodities over 2005–2013. Global energy and
metals firms spent $ 6 trillion digging in the Australian out-
back and drilling for oil in North Dakota and deep beneath
Brazil’s costal waters (The Economist (2016)). Data in this
sample are annual and include companies with calendar-year
end unequal to fiscal-year end. (This will slightly impact
year-fixed effects.) Analyses are based on an unbalanced
panel. This might come with the disadvantage that there is
a non-random sample in advanced time periods, as, for ex-
ample, a lack of investment took companies out of business
(Wooldridge (2013), p. 491). Balancing the panel, how-
ever, may introduce sample bias in that firms with certain
characteristics are more likely to enter or exit the sample,
such as survivorship bias (Andrén and Jankensgård (2015),
p. 206). Given the pros and cons, the robustness section
(7.3) includes an analysis based on a balanced panel. The
definition of the empirical variables follows in chapter 4.
Robust regression is an alternative to ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression when data is contaminated with
outliers or influential observations and it can be used for the
purpose of detecting influential observations. The idea of
robust regression is to weight the observations differently
based on how well behaved these observations are. Hence,
it is a form of weighted and reweighted least squares regres-
sion (Li (1985)). In Stata, the programming language used
for this thesis, a version of robust regression first runs OLS re-
gression, gets the Cook’s distance – a measure that combines
the information of leverage and residual of the observation
– for each observation, and then drops any observation with
Cook’s distance greater than one. In the following iteration
process, the most influential points are dropped, and then
cases with large absolute residuals are down-weighted (Ver-
ardi and Croux (2009)). Figure 1 shows the leverage versus
the squared residuals of observations, labeled with the entity
names (GVKEY) and serving as the basis for the computa-
tion of Cook’s distance. I drop the observations with Cook’s
distance greater one. (In figure 1, these are observations on
entities 109522 and 165743.) When the two observations
are excluded, the estimation results of robust regression and
OLS regression are very close together. Also, for OLS, stan-
dard errors are lower, F-statistics higher, adjusted R-squared
higher, and root mean squared error lower – and thereby
summary statistics more closely resemble those of the robust
regression. (Results are not shown in a table; the corre-
sponding Stata commands can be found in the appendix.)
The impact of outliers can be substantial. In Fazzari et al.
(1988), for example, eliminating or down-weighting high-
growth firm years reduces the estimated investment-cash
flow sensitivity of the entire low dividend-payout sample to
0.2–0.25. This is effectively identical to the estimate of their
unconstrained, low-retention sample. These results suggest
that FHP’s overall findings are at least partially impacted by
extreme observations, given that high-payout firms are less
likely to experience such extreme growth rates (Kaplan and
Zingales (1997), p. 206).
Biased findings based on differential outliers in sub-
samples are not restricted to Fazzari et al. (1988). These
differential outliers are one reason why “broad” classifica-
tion schemes are generally no longer without controversy.
Any splitting criterion that sorts firms into sub-samples with
differential outliers in growth rates – this holds, for example,
for splits on size and age as well –, so that certain groups
grow faster, may be biased toward finding a difference in
coefficients on cash flow. This bias may partially explain the
large body of evidence (in early literature) finding a higher
investment-cash flow sensitivity in fast growing companies,
which tend to be classified as financially constrained (Kaplan
and Zingales (1997), p. 206). In another criticism, Cleary
et al. (2007) find that two otherwise identical firms may
face differently severe problems of information asymmetry
– implying that there might be substantial heterogeneity re-
garding financing constraints in a single sub-sample that is
based on these broad classifications. Their model predicts
that the sensitivity of investment to cash flow is unambigu-
ously higher the greater the asymmetry of information.
This idea serves as a basis for research designs in a num-
ber of recent studies, such as Chowdhury et al. (2016), us-
ing measures of information asymmetry as proxies for cap-
ital market imperfections / financing constraints instead of
the broad splits mentioned above. Anyway, applying the re-
search design in Fazzari et al. (1988), I use industrial firm
data to analyze differences in investment in firms classified
according to their dividend- payout practices. Payout prac-
tices should reveal little about investment if the cost disad-
vantage of external finance is small. Firms will, in this case,
use external funds to smooth investment when internal fi-
nance fluctuates, independent of their dividend policy. If the
cost disadvantage is significant, however, investment should
be driven by fluctuations in cash flow for firms that retain and
invest most of their income, indicating that they do not have
a low-cost source of investment finance (Fazzari et al. (1988),
pp. 157– 158). Thus, observed payout practices may provide
a useful a priori criterion for identifying firms that are likely
to face relatively high costs of external finance.
The classification scheme applied in this paper divides
firms into three groups based on dividend payouts. Also, the
sample period is divided into two sub-sample periods: period
1 covers the years 1990–2002; period 2 covers 2003–2015.
Class-1 firms have a ratio of dividends to net income of less
than 0.1 for at least 16 years over the total sample period. In
order to be classified as a class-1 firm in either period 1, or
period 2, a firm needs to have a dividend-net income ratio
of less than 0.1 in at least eight years, respectively. Class-
2 firms have a dividend-income ratio of less than 0.3, but
more than 0.1, for at least 15 years over the total sample pe-
riod (seven years for periods 1 and 2, respectively). I use 15
and seven years due to the small number of observations in
the second class. The third class includes all other firms. A
firm’s income can be abnormally low in a particular year. Be-
cause of the resulting outlier in the dividend- income ratio,
this approach is more robust than classifying firms according
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Figure 1: Leverage vs. Squared Residuals of Observations, 1990–2015
to their average payout ratio. Also, the classification scheme
with at least 7–8 ratio observations in the respective time pe-
riods does not come at the cost of too many lost observations,
as most firm-year payout observations are available over the
entire (sub-)sample period. On top of that, the classification
scheme implies that many firms that went out of business
over the sample period are naturally excluded, because they
will not have that many payout observations – impeding the
impact of attrition bias. Structural interpretation of the co-
efficients should be seen with caution. As is standard in the
literature, it is the differential results across sub-samples that
inferences are based on.
Summary statistics of the three payout-classes are pre-
sented in table 1. These statistics are based on the sam-
ple that excludes the two observations with Cook’s distance
greater one. Clearly, the lowest number of observations is
available for class-2 firms. This is why the sub-sample in-
cludes firms with payout ratios of up to 0.3 – in contrast
to Fazzari et al. (1988), whose class-2 firms are in the pay-
out ratio range of 0.1–0.2. With 4.3, the average number of
years with positive dividends in class 1 is obviously the low-
est, given that class-2 and class-3 firms pay dividends in al-
most every year over the sample period. Median sales growth
figures are inconspicuous across classes, while their standard
deviations are very high for classes 1 and 3. Cash flow (0.2)
is insufficient to stem physical investment for class-1 firms
(0.94). Both variables are scaled by capital. Again, standard
deviations are very high for classes 1 and 3. Average capital
stock values across classes are much higher than median val-
ues, accounting for the number of high-capital-stock observa-
tions. Average capital stock growth over the sample period
is highest in classes 1 and 2, with some companies in class
2 experiencing very high growth in the capital stock, while
median capital stocks grow strongest in class 1. Finally, aver-
age M/B ratios are higher than median M/B ratios. Average
M/B is highest in class 1, driven by some high-growth/high-
potential companies. Median M/B is highest in class 3 and
lowest in class 1. Section 7.1 includes a comparison of de-
scriptive statistics to those in Fazzari et al. (1988).
4. Models
I examine two of the broad empirical specifications that
encompass the most common approaches of constructing
models’ investment demand side. First (and more impor-
tant), these are models based on a market-to-book, M/B,
ratio – though usually called q models of investment in the
literature – that emphasize market valuations of the firm’s
assets as the determinant of investment. Derived from an
adjustment cost technology, investment is determined ac-
cording to
Ii t/Ki t−1 = βo + β1(M/B)i t + ui t ′ (1)
where Ii t/Ki t−1 represents investment in property, plant,
and equipment (CapEx) for firm i during period t, normal-
ized by a firm’s capital stock at the beginning of the period.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics: Sample of Firms, 1990- 2015
Source: author’s calculations based on samples selected from the Compustat database. See text.
a. Firms with dividend-income ratios of less than 0.1 for at least 16 years.
b. Firms with dividend- income ratios greater than 0.1 but less than 0.3 for at least 15 years.
c. All other firms.
d. In millions of dollars
Category of firm
Statistic Class 1a Class 2b Class 3c
Number of observations 51,111 2,763 27,788
Median payout ratio 0 0.21 0.58
Average number of years with
positive dividends 42798 42790 42847
Median sales growth 8.4% 8.2% 0,05
Standard deviation sales growth 8,000.2% 14.9% 4,900.2%
Median investment-capital ratio 0.94 0.24 0.17
Standard deviation investment-capital ratio 42824 0.2 0.6
Median cash flow-capital ratio 0.2 0.49 0.19
Standard deviation cash flow-capital ratio 217.5 42795 21
Average capital stock, 1990d 154 929.8 2,457.2
Median capital stock, 1990d 42890 148.8 556.2
Average capital stock, 2015d 566.3 4,721.9 4,516
Median capital stock, 2015d 45.2 672.7 1,440.2
Average M/B ratio 42737 42767 42887
Median M/B ratio 0.3 0.6 0.7
βo is the normal value for I / K for the ith firm when M/B
is zero. M/B is calculated as number of common shares out-
standing, multiplied with the annual closing stock price, plus
the book value of current and long-term liabilities; the sum
is divided by the book value of total assets. These variables
are preferred over Compustat’s total debt (DT) and market
capitalization (MKVALT) variables, as for the two latter vari-
ables observations are unavailable prior to 1998. It is com-
mon practice to assume equivalence of the liabilities’ market
and book value. ui t is an error term. Some skeptical authors
point out that Tobin’s q is difficult to measure and has strict
conditions under which it is sufficient to assess how much
the firm should invest – this is why it is called M/B in this
paper. Hayashi (1982) has derived these conditions. There
are at least two problems in measuring q that might affect
the econometric results for liquidity: first, q may not reflect
market fundamentals when the stock market is excessively
volatile. Second, there might be measurement error in the
replacement capital stock in q (Hoshi et al. (1991), p. 43).
Hence, it should not be surprising that in investment regres-
sion equations that include (flow or stock of) liquidity and q,
both variables are significant. (Either q is mismeasured, or
liquidity constraints are important.) However, the intuition
of the M/B model is that, absent considerations of taxes or
capital market imperfections, a value-maximizing firm will
keep investing as long as the shadow value of an additional
unit of capital, marginal M/B, exceeds unity. In equilibrium,
the value of an extra unit of capital is just its replacement
cost, so that marginal M/B is unity. The theoretical advantage
of this framework in modeling the effects of internal finance
on investment (see below) is that M/B supposedly controls
for the market’s evaluation of the firm’s investment opportu-
nities (Fazzari et al. (1988), p. 165). This is important, as
internal finance also proxies for other unobservable determi-
nants of investment, in particular the profitability of invest-
ment. High liquidity signals that the firm has done well and
is likely to continue doing well. Thus, more liquid firms have
better investment opportunities; it is not surprising that they
tend to invest more (Hoshi et al. (1991), p. 36). Again, there
is theoretical ambiguity, this time on the economic interpre-
tation of a high cash stock. Almeida et al. (2004) claim that
constrained firms hoard cash to protect against future down-
turns. (They call this the cash flow sensitivity of cash.) Fol-
lowing this reasoning, high liquidity may be a signal for poor
performance, contrary to what Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharf-
stein (Hoshi et al. (1991), p. 36) outline.
4.1. M/B Specification
In this paper, investment is often determined using the
M/B model, including cash flow and firm and year fixed ef-
fects, for each of the three payout-classes. That is,
Ii t/Ki t−1 = βo + β1(M/B)i t + β2(C Fi t/Ki t−1)+
α1 +λt + ui t ′
(2)
where C Fi t/Ki t−1 is net income before depreciation, less
dividend payments, deflated by beginning-of-period capital.
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αi is a firm dummy to remove firm-specific effects. λi is a
year dummy to weed out macro shocks. (A detailed analysis
of estimation methods can be found in chapter 5.) The argu-
mentation for subtracting dividends in the cash flow number
follows the reasoning of Lintner (1956). Lintner shows that
dividend-smoothing behavior is widespread, based on three
important observations concerning dividend policies: first,
managers are primarily concerned with the stability of divi-
dends. They believe that the market puts a premium on firms
with a stable dividend policy. Second, earnings are the most
important determinant of any change in dividends. Most
companies appear to have a target payout ratio. If there is
a sudden unexpected increase in earnings, firms adjust their
dividends slowly. Also, firms are very reluctant to cut div-
idends. Third, management sets their dividend policy first.
Other policies are then adjusted, taking dividend policy as
given. For example, if investment opportunities are abundant
and the firm has insufficient internal funds, it would resort
to outside funds instead of cutting dividends. Hence, sub-
tracting dividends is meaningful, as dividends seem to have
a higher priority use of cash flow than investment. Anyway,
the robustness section includes a test on the effects of cash
flow defined without subtracting dividends.
Theories discussed in Fazzari et al. (1988) imply that for
firms that face asymmetric information problems in capital
markets, the supply of investment finance is not perfectly
elastic. This is in line with Myers and Majluf (1984), who
stress that if managers are better informed than investors
about a firm’s prospects, the firm’s risky securities will some-
times be underpriced, thereby raising the cost of external
finance. It is not only information problems, but also, as
described above, incentive problems that lead managers to
prefer financing investment with internal funds. Jensen and
Meckling (1976) argue that these incentive problems raise
the cost of external finance. Outside financing dilutes man-
agement’s ownership stake, thereby exacerbating incentive
problems that arise when managers control the firm but do
not own it. So, regardless of the true economic process at the
foundation of investment demand, i.e., no matter whether it
is a q model, an accelerator model or any other model, the
supply of low-cost finance, and therefore the level of internal
cash flow, enters the investment equation of firms for which
internal and external finance are not perfect substitutes. This
is confirmed by a large body of theoretical work that shows
that (flow and stock measures of) liquidity should be an im-
portant determinant of investment when there are informa-
tion problems in the capital markets. Basically all models that
posit some sort of information problem in the capital market
predict that more liquid firms should invest more. Models
also predict that liquidity is irrelevant when there are no in-
formation problems (Hoshi et al. (1991), pp. 33–34).
In a first alternative specification of the model in equa-
tion 2, I include an analysis of models with cash flow lags and
lagged M/B ratios, respectively. The rationale for this analy-
sis, apart from the possibility to compare the results to FHP
(1988, table 6), is that it can give greater insights on the ques-
tion whether cash flow contains news about investment op-
portunities. Effects of lagged coefficients on cash flow could
well reflect shortcomings in the empirical performance of the
M/B ratio. For example, in FHP (1988, pp. 31–32), Q is only
half as large (0.001 vs. 0.002) when their model includes
cash flow lags – a finding that supports this interpretation.
Another rationale is that cash flow could have explanatory
power in a time-to-build context, which could explain why a
contemporaneous coefficient on cash flow lacks significance.
In a second alternative specification, the effect of stock mea-
sures of a firm’s internal liquidity is analyzed with the model
Ii t/Ki t−1 = βo + β1(M/B)i t + β2(Cash/K)i t−1 +αi+
λt + ui t ′
(3)
where (Cash/k)i t−1 is the stock of liquidity, defined as cash
and short-term securities, i.e., securities the firm describes as
readily convertible into cash, normalized by the firm’s capi-
tal stock in the beginning of the year. The stock of liquidity is
measured at the beginning of the period to measure the stock
of liquid assets the firm has when it decides on investment at
the beginning of the period. This approach follows Kaplan
and Zingales (1997) and Kashyap et al. (1994). Stock mea-
sures of a firm’s internal liquidity, just like flow measures,
might have an effect on investment for firms that must pay
a premium for external funds; cash and marketable securi-
ties provide a low-cost source of investment finance for these
firms. A financial cushion through accumulated liquid re-
sources may reduce the sensitivity of investment to cash flow
fluctuations for such firms. Hence, one might expect to ob-
serve a positive effect of stock measures of liquidity for the
high-retention firms, whose investment is especially sensitive
to fluctuations in cash flow. The motivation for this test is
analogous to thoughts on precautionary saving. Managers
should accumulate a stock of liquid assets when the opera-
tional cash flow is high if they know that there is a wedge in
the costs of internal vis-à-vis external finance. That liquidity
can help to smooth investment over downturns, so that firms
impede the necessity to obtain potentially costly capital from
external sources. In addition to that, the financial cushion
provides collateral for new debt. Covenants may constrain a
firm’s ability to use stocks of liquidity. Therefore, when finan-
cially constrained firms experience a higher cash stock, they
might be able to increase CapEx. Financially unconstrained
firms – likely those in Class 3 that pay out a substantial por-
tion of their earnings in the form of dividends – are not ex-
pected to experience a significant impact of stock measures
of liquidity on investment. If these firms’ retained earnings
are lower than their desired level of investment, they should
be able to easily raise low-cost external finance.
A potential further reason for the importance of specify-
ing a model with cash stock as a key explanatory variable is
that it is less likely than cash flow to indicate much about the
profitability of new investments (Fazzari et al. (1988), pp.
179–181). However, Almeida et al. (2004) outline that high
liquidity may also be a signal for poor performance. Kaplan
and Zingales (Kaplan and Zingales (1997), pp. 202–203) ar-
gue that, in theory, there should be no difference between
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cash flow and cash stock: it does not matter whether an ex-
tra dollar enters the firm this period (cash flow) or whether
it was present in the firm in the beginning of the year (cash
stock). For this reason, they estimate a regression that mea-
sures liquidity as the sum of cash flow and cash stock. As
Fazzari et al. (1988) outline, there is a theoretical basis for
a significant isolated effect of cash stock on investment, so
that I incorporate Kaplan and Zingales (1997) approach and
estimate a regression adding the flow of cash to the stock of
cash.
4.2. Sales Accelerator Specification
The second empirical specification encompassing a com-
mon approach in constructing a model’s investment demand
side is the acceleration principle. I specify the following
model, in line with FHP (1988, table 7):
Ii t/Ki t−1 = βo + β1(C Fi t/Ki t−1) + β2(Si t/Ki t−1)+
β3(Si t−1/Ki t−2) + β4(Si t−2/Ki t−3)+
β5(Si t−3/Ki t−4) +αi +λt + ui t ,
(4)
where Si t/Ki t−1 is defined as a firm’s sales, deflated by
beginning-of-period net property, plant, and equipment. The
model also includes three lags of this ratio. In the robust-
ness chapter 7.3, I test whether production, that is sales
plus change in finished goods inventories, instead of only
sales, leads to different results. In a sales accelerator model,
fluctuations in sales or output motivate changes in capital
spending.
Many successful empirical investment models are based
on the traditional acceleration principle, despite a lack of a
compelling theory behind it (Hoshi et al. (1991), p. 35). For
example, Schiantarelli and Georgoutsos (1987) have shown
that when firms have monopoly power, lagged production
should be related to current investment. Incorporating this
sales model in the analysis is also helpful, as one possible ex-
planation for the effects of cash flow variables is that internal
finance is correlated with sales (omitted variable bias). As it
is typical that both sales and cash flow have significant ef-
fects in an investment equation, the question arises whether
the cash flow variable should be interpreted as a signal of the
profitability of investment not captured in the sales formu-
lation; or does significance mean that cash flow represents
low-cost investment supply for firms that face a wedge be-
tween the costs of internal and external finance? Incorporat-
ing the M/B ratio variable in the regression equation (in an
additional model) might help to resolve the question, as it
should be more adequate in capturing the prospective prof-
itability of investment than lags of past profits, given that it is
based on asset prices determined in forward-looking markets
(Fazzari et al. (1988), pp. 173– 175). However, both empiri-
cal specifications of a model’s investment demand side, M/B
and sales accelerator – and including the alternative specifi-
cations –, are imperfect attempts to control for effects that
are difficult to observe. Structural interpretation of the co-
efficients should be seen with caution. This is why, inter
alia, Fazzari et al. (1988) draw conclusions based on esti-
mated differences across the three retention classes, Hoshi
et al. (1991) make inferences based on the differences in the
effects of liquidity across the two subsets of Japanese firms,
and Kaplan and Zingales (1997) rest conclusions on the dif-
ferences across firms with various degrees of financing con-
straints.
5. Estimation Methods
This paper pays special attention to the various estima-
tion methods that are used for standard corporate finance
regression equations with panel data, such as the equations
handled here. In this chapter, these estimation methods are
introduced and discussed. Chapter 7.2 handles the estima-
tion specific results. A population multiple linear regression
model usually takes the following form:
y = βo + β1 x1 + β2 x2 + ...+ βk xk + u. (5)
The key assumption for this general multiple regression
model is E(u|x1, x2, ..., xk) = 0. It requires that all fac-
tors in the unobserved error term be uncorrelated with the
explanatory variables. It also means that one has correctly
accounted for the relationships between the dependent and
independent variables. Any problem that causes u to be
correlated with any of the explanatory variables causes the
assumption to fail (Stock and Watson (2015), pp. 236–238).
5.1. Ordinary Least Squares
OLS is a main estimation method. An exemplary esti-
mated OLS equation, in the case of two independent vari-
ables, looks as follows:
yˆ = βˆo + βˆ1 x1 + βˆ2 x2. (6)
OLS chooses the estimates that minimize the sum of squared
residuals. That is, given n observations on y, x1, and x2, the
argument that minimizes
∑n
i=1(yi−βˆo−βˆ1 x i1−βˆ2 x i2)2. The
estimates βˆ1 and βˆ2 have partial effect, or ceteris paribus, in-
terpretations. Hence, holding all other independent variables
constant, the coefficient on x1 measures the change in yˆ due
to a one-unit increase in x1 (Wooldridge (2013), pp. 72–76).
Under the first four Gauss-Markov assumptions, OLS is unbi-
ased. When a homoskedasticity assumption, i.e., a constant
error variance assumption, is added, OLS has an important
efficiency property; the estimator is then the best linear un-
biased estimator (BLUE), where best is defined as being the
most efficient. Adding an irrelevant variable to an equation
generally increases the variances of the remaining OLS esti-
mators because of multicollinearity (Wooldridge (2013), p.
105).
5.2. Fixed Effects
The combined entity and time FE regression method,
which is the main method used in this paper, eliminates
omitted variable bias arising both from unobserved variables
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that are constant over time and from unobserved variables
that are constant across entities. A model with a single ex-
planatory variable has the following form:
yi t = β1 x i t +αi +λt + ui t , (7)
where α1 is the unobserved effect, which is constant over
time and disappears in the within-transformation. λt denotes
a full set of year dummies, which can be left out from the
following transformation. For each i, equation 7 is averaged
over time:
y¯i = β1 x¯ i +α1 + u¯1. (8)
Then, equation 8 is subtracted from equation 7:
yi t − y¯i = β1(x i t − x¯ i + ui t − u¯i . (9)
Accordingly, in time-demeaned data, the unobserved effect,
αi , has disappeared:
y˜i t = β1 x˜ i t + u˜i t . (10)
The pooled OLS estimator that is based on time-demeaned
variables is called the FE estimator. It allows for arbitrary
correlation between the unobserved effect and the explana-
tory variables in any period. Because of this transforma-
tion, any explanatory variable that is constant over time gets
swept away. Hence, variables, such as a firm’s distance from
the airport, cannot be included in the regression equation
(Wooldridge (2013), p. 484–485). Regression software typ-
ically does not use the dummy variable model formulation
(not presented here), as it is tedious if the number of entities
is large (Stock and Watson (2015), p. 403). The number of
entity-specific intercepts required would be too large. Natu-
rally, time demeaning is potentially problematic when the key
explanatory variables do not vary much over time. But even
with sufficient time-varying explanatory variables, the FE es-
timator can be subject to biases – just like the first differences
(FD) estimator (see below). For example, strict exogeneity is
a critical assumption. If it does not hold, the estimator is in-
consistent. Fortunately, unlike the FD estimator, if each x i t j
is uncorrelated with ui t , but the strict exogeneity assumption
is otherwise violated – e.g., when the lagged dependent vari-
able is included among the regressors –, the FE estimator’s
bias tends to zero at the rate of 1/T in theory (Wooldridge
(2013), pp. 473–491). In a multiple regression with panel
data, if the FE regression assumptions hold, the FE estimator
is consistent and asymptotically normally distributed when n
is large (Stock and Watson (2015), p. 406). The assumptions
(see table 2) extend the least squares assumptions to panel
data.
5.2.1. Strict Exogeneity Test
The theoretical part on the strict exogeneity assumption is
put as an FE sub-chapter, because the strict exogeneity tests
are mainly based on the FE transformation, given that this
is the main estimation method for linear unobserved effects
panel data models employed in this paper, in the investment-
cash flow literature, and in the papers published in the three
leading finance journals (Grieser and Hadlock (2015), p. 9).
However, I also conduct strict exogeneity tests based on the
FD transformation. With an unobserved effect, the strict ex-
ogeneity assumption can have the following form:
E(yi t |x i1, x i2, ..., x iT ,αi) = E(yi t |x i t ,αi) = x i tβ +αi . (11)
Once controlled for x i t and αi , x is has no partial effect on
yi t for s 6 t. This assumption is more reasonable than the
one without the unobserved effect. The natural assumption
is that, once it is controlled for contemporaneous inputs and
the unobserved effect, explanatory variables in other years do
not affect the dependent variable during the current year. In
every year, the explanatory variables generally depend on the
unobserved effect. So, it is likely that some partial correlation
between the dependent variable in year t and explanatory
variables in other years will exist if it is not controlled for the
unobserved effect (Wooldridge (2010), pp. 252–254).
Following the approach by Grieser and Hadlock (2015),
I conduct strict exogeneity tests that follow the procedure
outlined by Wooldridge (2010). The strict exogeneity tests
add one-period-ahead future values of the independent vari-
able to the regression model and test whether the associated
coefficient is zero, as should be the case if strict exogeneity
holds. (In my case, I use a CapEx lag (dependent variable)
and cash flow lag (independent variable), and augment the
equation with contemporaneous cash flow.) Hence, evidence
of a non-zero one-period-ahead coefficient is taken as evi-
dence against the strict exogeneity assumption. Giving the-
oretical ground for the violation of the assumption in this
equation, economic intuition suggests that (physical) invest-
ment today translates into a future cash inflow stream – this
is the nature of decision making based on a project’s expected
net present value. The FE investment equation that is subject
to the Wooldridge (2010) test takes the following form:
Ii t−1/Ki t−2 = βo + β1(C Fi t/Ki t−1) + β2(C Fi t−1/Ki t−2)+
αi +λt + ui t .
(12)
The test is for a model in which the dependent variable is a
linear function of the firm fixed effect, year dummies, and the
selected explanatory variable. Apart from the test on equa-
tion 12, a test for a model in which all of the independent
variables are included (that is, cash flow, as well as M/B)
is conducted as well. Both tests are for the total sample
period. Given the lack of general significance of the tradi-
tional investment-cash flow sensitivity (see results section),
the strict exogeneity test is conducted again with a regres-
sion of total investment on cash flow, as results for this equa-
tion are relatively significant (see robustness section). This is
meaningful, because a lack of contemporaneous correlation
of cash flow and CapEx (i.e., no violation of simple exogene-
ity) makes the finding of a violation of the strict exogeneity
assumption unlikely, undermining the relevance of strict ex-
ogeneity tests in the setting of this thesis. For this equation, I
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Table 2: Fixed Effects Regression Assumptions
Source: Wooldridge (2013), pp. 509–510.
Assumption FE.1 For each i, the model is yi t = β1 x i t1 + . . . + βk x i tk + αi + ui t , t = 1, T , where the β j are
the parameters to estimate and αi is the unobserved effect.
Assumption FE.2 The sample is randomly chosen from the cross section.
Assumption FE.3 No perfect multicollinearity is present. In addition to that, at least for some entities, each
explanatory variable changes over time.
Assumption FE.4 Given all t values of x i and the unobserved effect, the error term has conditional mean
zero. This implies that there is no omitted variable bias. This assumption is violated if
current ui is correlated with past, present, or future values of x i .
Assumption FE.5 The errors are homoskedastic.
Assumption FE.6 Conditional on all explanatory variables and αi , the idiosyncratic errors are uncorrelated.
Assumption FE.7 The variables are i.i.d. across entities for i = 1, . . . , n. This assumption holds if entities
are selected by random sampling from the population.
conduct tests on periods 1 and 2 as well. I follow the proce-
dure outlined in this paragraph for tests on the FD transfor-
mation. The first-differenced equation is augmented by the
standard variable of contemporaneous cash flow, scaled by
the capital stock.
5.2.2. Magnitudes of Errors if no Strict Exogeneity
Economic theory also suggests that strict exogeneity
should be violated in many other standard panel finance
settings. Hence, general inconsistency of the FE and FD
estimates in these settings is a concern. However, if the in-
consistency is small – as many researchers assumed prior
to Grieser and Hadlock (2015) –, inferences regarding the
magnitude of a coefficient or whether it is significantly dif-
ferent from zero may be at least approximately valid. As
Wooldridge (2010) notes, substantial differences between
FE and FD estimators are often an indication of a violation
of strict exogeneity – and suggest that the problem caused
by inconsistency is one of a large magnitude. To gauge the
possible magnitude of inference errors, I analyze the relative
variation in the FE and FD estimates based on an unbalanced,
as well as on a balanced panel. Under strict exogeneity, these
two estimates asymptotically converge to the same true un-
derlying parameter value. If the assumption is violated, both
estimators have different probability limits, neither of which
is the true parameter value of interest (Grieser and Hadlock
(2015), p. 3).
As a researcher, a reason for working with FE, though
knowing that its estimator might be inconsistent, is that he
could hope for a 1/T save. The FE and FD estimators are
both inconsistent when strict exogeneity fails. However, the
degree of inconsistency of the FE estimator may be smaller
in a long panel than the inconsistency in the FD estimator.
This is because the FE estimator effectively differences vari-
ables from their means while the FD estimator takes differ-
ences from adjacent periods. Feedback effects are intuitively
more influential when directly comparing adjacent periods.
In fact, this notion is formally captured in that the inconsis-
tency of the FE estimator is in the order of 1/T, while the
inconsistency of the FD estimator is independent of T. This
is why researchers, when a long panel is available, hope that
the FE coefficients are relatively informative. For this to be
justified, a firm’s fixed effect for the dependent variable of in-
terest needs to be stable over the entire sample period. But,
for example, due to occasional changes to an average firm’s
management, shareholder base, and capital, economic intu-
ition makes obvious that the assumption of a stable unit-level
fixed effect over a long sample period may not hold. In fact,
Grieser and Hadlock (2015) do not find support for the sta-
bility of the underlying unit-level fixed effects coefficients.
5.3. First Differences
A third main estimation method employed is first differ-
encing. After first differencing the data, a full equation looks
like
∆yi t = αo +α3d3t +α4d4t + ...+αT d3T + β1∆x i t1+
...+ βk∆x i tk +∆ui t ,
(13)
where there are T-1 time periods on each unit i.d3t , d4t , etc.
denote year dummies. ∆yi t is equal to yi t minus yi t−1. The
total number of observations is N(T-1). As there is nothing
to subtract from t=1, there is no differenced equation for
t=1. By allowing an intercept to be included, a differenced
equation for t=2 must be excluded. The reason I include a
dummy variable for each time period is to account for the sec-
ular changes that are not being modeled. This is meaningful
when T is small relative to N. Provided that the observations
have been properly organized and the differencing has been
carefully done, equation 13 is simple to estimate by pooled
OLS. Arranged chronologically, the first T records are for the
first cross-sectional observations, the second T records are for
the second cross-sectional observations, arranged chronolog-
ically, and so forth. Just like with the FE method, there are
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potential problems with first differencing when the key ex-
planatory variables do not vary much over time. The strict ex-
ogeneity assumption is even more critical for the FD method.
If this assumption is violated, the bias in the FD estimator
does not depend on T, that is, having more time periods does
not reduce the inconsistency in the estimator. Also, employ-
ing the FD estimator can be worse than pooled OLS if at least
one of the explanatory variables is subject to measurement
error (Wooldridge (2013), pp. 473–491). When the dis-
turbances follow a random walk, the FD estimator is more
efficient than the FE estimator. The FE estimator, however,
is more efficient when the errors are serially uncorrelated
(Wooldridge (2010), p. 284). In many applications, the un-
observed factors that change over time are serially correlated.
Anyway, in practice, the FE estimator is used more frequently
than the FD estimator. This is because the unobserved effects
model is typically stated with serially uncorrelated idiosyn-
cratic errors (Wooldridge (2013), p. 490). Under assump-
tions FD.1–FD.6, which are quite similar to the FE assump-
tions, the FD estimator of the β j is the BLUE, conditional on
the explanatory variables (table 3). FD.7 is needed in order
to have a normal distribution of the FD estimators. Without
this assumption, it can be relied on the asymptotic approxi-
mations.
5.4. Random Effects
In using FE or FD, the goal is to eliminate αi , because
the effect presumably is correlated with one or more of the
x i t j . A transformation to eliminate αi is redundant (and
inefficient) when one thinks that αi is uncorrelated with
each explanatory variable in all time periods. So, when
Cov(x i t j ,αi) = 0, the standard unobserved effects model of
equation 7 becomes a random effects (RE) model; if correla-
tion is assumed, FE or FD should be used. (The RE estimation
method is the fourth and last method used/analyzed in this
paper.) In cases in which the unobserved effect is thought
to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, the β j
can be consistently estimated using a single cross section,
as there is no need to control for the unobserved effect in
order to avoid omitted variable bias. Though there is no
need for panel data, a single cross section disregards much
useful information in the other time periods. Under the RE
assumptions, employing a pooled OLS procedure instead of
RE produces consistent estimators of the β j as well; but it
allows for positive serial correlation in the composite error
term. The composite error term is defined as vi t = ai + ui t .
So, the pooled OLS procedure ignores a key feature of the
model: because ai is in the error term in each time period,
the vi t are autocorrelated. Generalized least squares (GLS)
can be used to solve the serial correlation in the errors. The
transformed GLS equation turns out to be
yi t − θ y¯i = βo(1− θ ) + β1(x i t1 − θ x¯ i1) + ... +
βk(x i tk − θ x¯ ik) + (vi t − θ v¯i), (14)
where, again, the overbar denotes time averages. The trans-
formed GLS equation involves quasi-demeaned data. The
difference to time-demeaned data is that the RE transfor-
mation subtracts a fraction, θ , of the time averages. This
fraction depends on σ2u,σ
2
a, and the number of time peri-
ods, T. The FE estimator, as usual, subtracts the time aver-
ages from the corresponding variable. The fraction, θ , equals
1 − Corr(vi t , Vis). Pooled OLS is obtained when θ = 0. FE
is obtained when θ = 1. Whereas, in practice, the estima-
tor is never zero or one, the RE estimates will be close to the
pooled OLS estimates when σ2a is small relative to the error
variance, which implies that the unobserved effect is rela-
tively unimportant. It is more common for the unobserved
effect’s variance to be large relative to σ2u in which case θˆ
will be closer to unity. The GLS estimator, which uses θ , is
called RE estimator and is simply the pooled OLS estimator
of equation 14, in which the errors are no longer autocorre-
lated. RE allows for explanatory variables that are constant
over time. This clearly is an advantage over FE and FD. These
time-constant right-hand-side variables can be included in
the RE method because only a fraction of the time averages is
subtracted, given that RE assumes that the unobserved effect
is uncorrelated with these variables. However, in many ap-
plications, the whole reason for using panel data is to allow
the unobserved effect to be correlated with the explanatory
variables. Therefore, situations when RE is preferred over
FE/FD are scarce. This is though FE and FD are not neces-
sarily more suitable than RE when there is a time-varying key
policy variable. It is just that it takes, for example, a natural
experiment setting to achieve Cov(x i t j ,αi) = 0. It is much
more likely that the regressors themselves are outcomes of
choice processes. Compared to pooled OLS, RE is preferred,
as it is generally more efficient. Comparing efficiency of RE
to FE, the RE estimator is more efficient for coefficients on
time varying-explanatory variables. But FE is not meant to
be efficient under the RE assumptions, which can be seen in
table 4. There is a tradeoff between robustness and efficiency,
as FE is just intended to be robust to correlation between αi
and the x i t j . Naturally, the RE assumptions include the re-
quirement that αi is independent of all explanatory variables
in all time periods. On top of that, the ideal RE assumptions
include most of the FE assumptions. Under these, the estima-
tor is consistent (not unbiased) and asymptotically normally
distributed (Wooldridge (2013), pp. 490–496). Assumption
FE.3 is omitted, because time-constant explanatory variables
are allowed (Wooldridge (2013), p. 510).
6. Standard Errors
The asymptotic 95 percent confidence interval is βˆ ±
1.96 × se, where se stands for standard error. Hypothesis
testing is typically based on the Wald t-statistic, defined as
w = (βˆ − βo)/se. It is clear that both βˆ and se are critical
ingredients for statistical inference, so that obtaining accu-
rate standard errors is of fundamental importance (Cameron
and Miller (2015), pp. 4–5). In panel data, the regression
error can be correlated over time within an entity. This
correlation does not introduce bias into the fixed effects
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Table 3: First Differences Regression Assumptions
Source: Wooldridge (2013), pp. 482–483.
Assumption FD.1 For each i, the model is yi t = β1 x i t1 + . . . + βk x i tk + αi + ui t , t = 1, T , where the β j are the
parameters to estimate and αi is the unobserved effect.
Assumption FD.2 The sample that is being worked with is randomly chosen from the cross section.
Assumption FD.3 No perfect multicollinearity is present. In addition to that, at least for some entities, each ex-
planatory variable changes over time.
Assumption FD.4 Given all t values of x i and the unobserved effect, the error term has conditional mean zero.
This implies that there is no omitted variable bias. This assumption is violated if current ui is
correlated with past, present, or future values of x i .
Assumption FD.5 The differenced errors are homoskedastic.
Assumption FD.6 The differenced errors follow a random walk; the ui t are serially uncorrelated.
Assumption FD.7 Conditional on the explanatory variables, the ∆ui t are i.i.d. normal variables.
Table 4: Random Effects Regression Assumptions
Source: Wooldridge (2013), pp. 510–511.
Assumption RE.1 There is no perfect multicollinearity.
Assumption RE.2 Given all explanatory variables, the expected value of αi is constant. This is the key distinction
between RE and FE, as it rules out Corr(x i t j , ai) 6 0.
Assumption RE.3 ai is homoskedastic.
estimator, but it affects the variance of the fixed effects es-
timator and, thus, it affects how one computes standard
errors, just like with heteroskedasticity (Stock and Watson
(2015), pp. 411–413). It is not unusual to have applica-
tions where standard errors that control for within-cluster
correlation are several times larger than default standard
errors that ignore such correlation (see robustness section
below for an example). A failure to control for within-cluster
correlation can lead to these misleadingly small standard
errors, and, consequently, misleadingly narrow confidence
intervals, large t-statistics, and low p-values. The need to
control for within-cluster correlation increases not only with
an increase in the size of within-cluster error correlation,
but also with the size of within-cluster correlation of regres-
sors and with the number of observations within a cluster.
The above means that, in OLS estimation, there can be a
great loss of efficiency if errors are correlated within cluster
rather than completely uncorrelated. If the model system-
atically overpredicts (or underpredicts) the regressors in a
given firm (or industry, depending on the cluster), the error
term is positively correlated with the firm/industry. In this
case, default OLS standard errors will be biased downwards
and, thus, greatly overstate estimator precision (Cameron
and Miller (2015), pp. 6–7). Standard errors for FE regres-
sions are cluster-robust standard errors, which are robust
not only to the described autocorrelation within an entity,
but also to heteroskedasticity (Stock and Watson (2015), p.
411). For first differences, it must be assumed that ∆ui t is
serially uncorrelated for the usual standard errors and test
statistics to be valid. Only when ui t follows a random walk
will ∆ui t be serially uncorrelated (Wooldridge (2013), pp.
469–470). A regression model with limited or no control
for within-cluster error correlation is estimated to control
for clustered errors, as the cluster-robust standard errors
are obtained post-estimation. Rogers (1993) incorporated
this method in Stata. Instead of requiring specification of
a model for within-cluster error correlation, these cluster-
robust standard errors require the additional assumption
that the number of clusters, rather than just the number of
observations, goes to infinity (Cameron and Miller (2015),
p. 5).
There are two principles that give guidance to determine
what to cluster over: first, whenever there is reason to believe
that both the regressors and the errors might be correlated
within cluster, one should think about clustering defined in
a broad enough way to account for that clustering. Second,
Vˆcluster[βˆ] is the group average, a term that gets closer to
V [βˆ] only as the number of groups becomes large. (Vˆcluster
is the standard estimator for the variance of the cluster.) This
means that, if one defines very large clusters, so that there are
very few clusters to average over, the resulting Vˆcluster[βˆ] can
be a very poor estimate of V [βˆ]. Just like when comparing
the estimation methods FE and RE in chapter 5.4, these two
principles illustrate the bias-variance tradeoff that is common
in many estimation problems: larger and fewer clusters have
less bias but more variability. There is neither a general solu-
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tion to this tradeoff, nor a formal test of the level at which to
cluster. The consensus is to be conservative and avoid bias,
and use bigger and more aggregate clusters when possible. In
practice, one should start clustering at a narrow level, which
is then being broadened until there is relatively little change
in the standard errors (Cameron and Miller (2015), p. 21).
This procedure is being followed in section 7.3, and serves
as a basis for the decision to cluster over firms in this paper.
There are several settings where one may not need to use
cluster-robust standard errors at all. In any of these cases,
it is always possible to still obtain these errors and compare
them with the default standard errors. The appreciable dif-
ferences revealed in the robustness section serve as a gen-
eral reason for choosing cluster-robust standard errors. The
above-mentioned cluster-robust standard error assumption,
which implies that the number of clusters should go to infin-
ity, is another argument in favor of clustering at firm level.
As outlined in chapter 5, Wooldridge (Wooldridge (2010), p.
256) writes that for pooled OLS, the composite errors will
be autocorrelated due to the presence of ai in each time pe-
riod. Hence, inference using pooled OLS requires robust test
statistics.
7. Results
Table 5 presents estimates of the M/B investment model,
including cash flow, for each of the three retention-classes.
The equations were estimated with fixed firm and year ef-
fects. Results are presented for three time periods, 1990–2002
(period 1), 2003–2015 (period 2), and 1990–2015 (total
sample period). The striking result is that it is only the coef-
ficient on cash flow for group 2 that is strongly statistically
and slightly economically significant; I would rather expect
significance for class-1 firms. The coefficient amounts to
0.088 for period 1, 0.033 for period 2, and 0.04 for the total
sample period, and is always significant at least at the five-
percent level. Economically, this means that an increase in
the cash flow-capital ratio by one increases the investment-
capital ratio by 0.088 (period 1). An increase by one is
equivalent to increasing the cash flow, scaled by capital, of
the median class-2 firm by just over 200 percent. An effect
on investment-capital of 0.088 is equivalent to 37 percent of
the median class-2 firm’s investment-capital ratio (see table
1). Hence, for the median class-2 firm over 1990–2002, in-
creasing the cash flow-capital ratio by 200 percent translates
into an increase in the investment-capital ratio of 37 percent.
Sticky dividends, that is, a reluctance to cut dividends,
cannot be the driver of this finding, because the signaling
effect is incorporated in the definition of cash flow, in which
dividends are already subtracted. Also, the signaling effect
should then lead to cash flow significance for the third-class
firms as well. The underlying rationale for a potential impact
is that, in the case of small cost differentials between internal
and external finance, mature firms with substantial payouts
might reduce investment instead of cutting dividends when
cash flow falls (Fazzari et al. (1988), p. 183).
Agency costs of internal finance, that is, potential “man-
agerial waste” on less productive investments, could be a
driver of the effect – just like irrational or overly risk-averse
managers, who choose to rely primarily on operational cash
flow to invest despite the possibility to get low-cost exter-
nal funds (Kaplan and Zingales (1997), p. 173; Andrén and
Jankensgård (2015)). But again, this point should then hold
for class-3 firms as well – but for these firms, the coefficient
on cash flow is statistically and economically insignificant in
any sample period examined. As outlined in Cleary et al.
(2007), two otherwise identical firms may face severe dif-
ferences in asymmetric information problems. The authors
conclude that a model that captures information asymme-
tries (bid-ask spreads) is more adequate to proxy for financ-
ing constraints than a broad proxy, such as dividend payouts.
Though this potentially explains the findings presented here,
it stands in contrast to the vast literature using these broad
proxies to classify firms according to their degree of financ-
ing constraints. Still, dividend payouts specifically might no
longer serve as an adequate proxy for financing constraints.
However, the class-2 coefficient on cash flow is insignificant
when sales variables are included in the model (see table 8).
This suggests that the apparent correlation between cash flow
and investment in these (more mature) firms may be due to
the omission of output terms important in reconciling the dif-
ference between marginal and average M/B . Still, this should
then hold for the third class as well.
The general interpretation of a lack of significance of cash
flow in explaining investment across the three payout-classes
is that there is only a small (if at all) cost disadvantage of ex-
ternal finance, so that payout ratios reveal nothing about in-
vestment: firms will use external funds to smooth investment
when internal finance fluctuates. This finding is in line with
the growing literature showing a decrease (often disappear-
ance) of the investment-cash flow sensitivity (inter alia, Chen
and Chen (2012)). No present financing constraints – mea-
sured by the investment-cash flow sensitivity – across classes
could be, as described in chapter 1, driven by a) the down-
ward omitted variable bias that might occur due to a failure
to account for external finance in the regression, b) a dete-
rioration in the relative importance of tangible investment,
and/or c) an increased and cheaper usage of public equity
markets by young firms (Brown and Petersen (2009)).
A different aspect is described in Kaplan and Zingales (Ka-
plan and Zingales (1997), p. 205). They outline that when
deflating variables by net property, plant, and equipment, es-
timates are only consistent when there is no growth, among
other things. So, if investment and cash flow grow at a rate
similar to the rate of sales growth, part of the two variables’
co-movement may be due to a scale factor. As this effect bi-
ases the investment-cash flow sensitivity upwards, firms with
higher annual growth rates may drive the results. Neither
the median sales growth of class-1 firms (8.4 percent), nor
that of class-2 firms (8.2 percent) is abnormally high, such
as the 18 percent growth rate in the sample of Kaplan and
Zingales (1997). Unlike in Fazzari et al. (1988), outliers
(see the high standard deviation of sales growth for classes
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Table 5: Effects of Cash Flow and M/B on Investment, Various Periods, 1990-2015a
Source: author’s estimates of equation 2 based on a sample of firm data from Compustat database. See text.
a. Property, plant and equipment and K is beginning-of-period capital stock. The equations were estimated using fixed firm
and year effects (not reported). The constant is not reported. Cluster-robust standard errors appear in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.l.
b. Independent variables are defined as follows: (C F/K)i t is the cash flow-capital ratio, defined as the sum of net income
and depreciation, les s dividend payments, deflated by beginning-of-period capital. (M/Bi t is the market-to-book ratio. It is
calculated as the common stock, multiplied with the annual closing stock price, plus current and long term liabilities; the sum
is divided by total assets.
Independent variable and summary statisticb Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
1990-2002
(C F/K)i t -0.011* 0.088*** 0.036
(0.007) (0.016) (0.044)
(M/B)i t 0.009 0.016*** -0.000
(0.011) (0.003) (0.003)
Within R2 0.0124 0.425 0.0790
2003-2015
(C F/K)i t 0.022 0.033** 0.000
(0.020) (0.014) (0.000)
(M/B)i t 0.051 0.002** 0.009***
(0.041) (0.001) (0.003)
Within R2 0.0140 0.0852 0.008
1990-2015
(C F/K)i t -0.007 0.040*** -0.003
(0.008) (0.015) (0.003)
(M/B)i t -0.003 0.007* 0.005***
(0.009) (0.004) (0.002)
Within R2 0.004 0.104 0.016
1 and 3) do not seem to bias the sensitivity upwards, given
the lack of significance in the cash flow coefficients. Apart
from that, a lack of significance of class 1 firms’ coefficient on
cash flow might be because class-1 firms include companies
that are in financial distress. For these, it is plausible that
there are low investment-cash flow sensitivities. For exam-
ple, creditors might force an insolvent firm to use additional
cash flow to repay debt rather than for CapEx. Necessarily,
this reduces the investment-cash flow sensitivity (Kaplan and
Zingales (1997), p. 208).
It is unexpected that there is no (general small) sensitiv-
ity of investment to cash flow for the vast majority of firms,
as this sensitivity would be easy to justify. There is a wedge
between internal and external costs of finance for all firms
as long as some transaction costs are involved (Kaplan and
Zingales (1997), p. 173). Findings might be interpreted in
that transaction costs might simply be too low by now to es-
tablish a sensitivity of investment to cash flow. Finally, it is
intuitive that the cash flow effect on investment of class-2
firms is stronger in period 1 (0.088) than in period 2 (0.033)
and stronger than over the total sample period (0.04). Asym-
metric information should reduce with the degree to which
the market understands the companies and its projects, that
is, with the time the companies are in existence.
There is no clear-cut pattern in the coefficients on M/B .
The coefficient on M/B is statistically significant for class-2
across all periods. For class 1, the coefficient is economically
significant (0.051) in the period 2003–2015. For class 3, it is
statistically significant in the second period, as well as for the
entire sample period. These findings are not surprising, as in
most empirical studies, the size of the coefficient on M/B is
small. Also, in cases, in which there is a premium for issu-
ing new shares, there is a possibility that the firm finds itself
at a point of discontinuity where all profits are retained, no
dividends are paid, and the firm’s future prospects are not
good enough to induce it to issue new shares. In that case,
M/B does not matter, while cash flow should matter (Dev-
ereux and Schiantarelli (1990), p. 293). This argument is
based on the adverse selection argument in Myers and Ma-
jluf (1984).
In addition to that, as addressed in section 4, the market-
to-book ratio may not reflect market fundamentals during
times when the stock market is excessively volatile. In this
case, one would expect that during times of potential spec-
ulative bubbles or fads in the stock market over the sam-
ple period (dot-com bubble, financial crisis), the coefficients
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on M/B and cash flow should be different, compared with
more stable periods. In particular, one may expect that M/B
matters less relative to cash flow during these extreme times
(Blanchard et al. (1993)). Obviously, even ex-post, it is dif-
ficult to identify unambiguously when bubbles/fads caused
stock prices to be a poor reflection of fundamentals. A glance
at the within R-squared numbers underlines that the regres-
sions are driven by the cash flow coefficients. Within R-
squared is, with 0.425, high for class 2 in the first period (in
which the cash flow coefficient is the highest as well). For pe-
riod 2 and the total sample period, within R-squared figures
for class 2 are noteworthy as well. For classes 1 and 3 – with
the small exception of class 3, first period, due to a cash flow
coefficient of 0.036 – within R-squared is not substantially
different from zero.
Table 6 reports estimates of alternative specifications in
order to test the previous result’s robustness and to check
whether cash flow lags have a stronger effect on investment,
for example, in a time-to-build context. Results are reported
for both periods, 1990–2002 and 2003–2015, for each of the
three payout-classes. The first model in table 6 includes two
cash flow lags. For classes 1 and 3 over both time periods, co-
efficients on these lags are statistically and economically in-
significant. The coefficient on contemporaneous cash flow of
class 2 is robust to the incorporation of the lags. This implies
that collinearity among cash flow variables does not impact
the coefficient on C Fi t/Ki t−1. Lagged cash flow does neither
have an economically significant impact on investment for
class-2 firms. Especially since the data used are annual, to
the extent that the differences in the cash flow effects across
classes reflect the impact of financial constraints on invest-
ment, one would expect that these differences are most ev-
ident in the coefficient on current cash flow. This is based
on Andrew and Blanchard (1986), who compute a present
value series of marginal profits in a M/B model of investment
under various assumptions and find that it is only the first
of three lags of quarterly profits that is statistically different
from zero. This time period falls within the contemporane-
ous annual observation, that is, C Fi t/Ki t−1. Thus, an effect
of coefficients on lagged cash flow might well reflect short-
comings in M/B ’s empirical performance. But coefficients
on M/B do not change with the incorporation of cash flow
lags, so that lagged cash flow does not seem to capture news
about investment opportunities. The second model includes
a lagged market-to-book ratio variable. Some rejections of
versions of theq theory result from a significant lagged M/B
coefficient explaining investment. Adding lagged M/B does
not change the estimation results of M/B for class 1 with re-
gards to statistical significance. In the second class, the coef-
ficient on M/B is no longer significant, whereas lagged M/B
is significant at the ten percent level in the second period. In
the third class, both coefficients on M/B are now significant;
the period-2 coefficient on lagged M/B is significant as well.
The pattern of the cash flow coefficients is virtually identical.
The first model in table 7 presents the estimation results
of equation 3. It is an augmented M/B equation similar to
equation 2, but includes the cash stock variable. Results are
reported for 1990–2015. Clearly, the coefficients on the cash
stock are statistically and economically insignificant across
the three classes. Thus, the coefficients on the other variables
– as well as within R-squared – are indistinguishable from the
estimation results in table 5. This implies the following: a)
the stock of liquidity does not function as a financial cushion
to smooth investment and to reduce the sensitivity of invest-
ment to cash flow; b) a cushion does not seem to provide
collateral for new debt, which could be used for CapEx; c)
cash stock does not proxy for longer lags of cash flow – but
lags of cash flow were insignificant already; d) as expected,
cash stock does not reveal any news about the profitability of
investments. Results might also be impacted by an unclear
relation of cash holdings to financing constraints, as outlined
in Hadlock and Pierce (2010). To the extent that the signifi-
cant coefficient on cash flow for the second class is driven by
data issues or omitted accelerator effects of sales, clear-cut
insignificance of cash stock is a windfall for the hypothesis
that there is really no significant cost disadvantage for exter-
nal finance for any of the three payout-classes. The second
model in table 7 includes the sum of the flow of cash and the
stock of cash instead of two separate variables. As cash stock
does not capture any information relevant for explaining the
variation in CapEx, the sum of cash flow and cash stock is less
helpful in explaining investment than cash flow itself. This
leads to a lower statistical and economic significance of the
coefficient on the sum relative to the coefficient on cash flow
and, hence, a lower R-squared.
Table 8 presents estimated equations for the three payout-
classes that include cash flow and current and lagged val-
ues of sales. Two equations are reported: one that includes
only cash flow augmented by sales variables (see equation
4 above), and a second one that adds M/B to that equation
4. In both estimations, it is striking that none of the coeffi-
cients on cash flow is significant, while the contemporane-
ous effect of sales is approximately equally significant in eco-
nomic terms across the three classes and statistically signifi-
cant in the second class. Therefore, the effects of cash flow
in the M/B model can indeed be explained by the correlation
of cash flow and sales – and, hence, by an omitted variable
bias. Fluctuations in sales seem to motivate changes in cap-
ital spending; cash flow does not seem to represent an ad-
ditional supply of low-cost investment finance for firms that
have to pay a premium for external funds. Findings are not
impacted when the equation is augmented by M/B .
7.1. Comparison to Fazzari et al. (1988)
Beginning with Fazzari et al. (1988), a comprehensive
empirical literature has documented that a positive and sig-
nificant relationship between cash flow and investment ex-
ists, holding investment opportunities constant (Andrén and
Jankensgård (2015), p. 204). In addition to that, almost all
of the earlier studies support the Fazzari et al. (1988) find-
ings that financial constraints positively affect the sensitivity
of investment to cash flow (Gatchev et al. (2010), p. 729).
Though this financing constraints view has been challenged
and the interpretation of the investment-cash flow sensitivity
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Table 6: Effects of Cash Flow and M/B on Investment: Alternative Specifications, Various Periods, 1990-2015a
Source: same like table 5.
a. The dependent variable is the investment-capital ratio (I/K)i t . All independent variables are as defined in table 5, note b.
Equations are estimated with fixed firm and year effects (not reported). The constant is not reported. Cluster-robust standard
errors appear in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Independent Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
and summary statistic 1990-2002 2003-2015 1990-2002 2003-2015 1990-2002 2003-2015
Model with cash flow lags
(C F/K)i t -0.014 0.028 0.089*** 0.027*** -0.001** -0.000
(0.009) (0.027) (0.017) (0.010) (0.001) (0.000)
(C F/K)i t−1 -0.004 -0.005 -0.010 0.030*** -0.005 0.001
(0.005) (0.004) (0.011) (0.009) (0.006) (0.001)
(C F/K)i t−2 -0.000 -0.001 0.029*** 0.003 0.016 -0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.006) (0.014) (0.000)
(M/B)i t 0.000 0.058 0.015*** 0.002* 0.004** 0.006
(0.006) (0.044) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004)
Within R2 0.031 0.021 0.472 0.120 0.007 0.009
Model including lagged market-to-book ratio
(C F/K)i t -0.011 0.029 0.088*** 0.032** -0.000 0.000
(0.007) (0.021) (0.017) (0.014) (0.001) (0.000)
(M/B)i t 0.017 0.052 0.017*** 0.001 0.005** 0.002**
(0.016) (0.041) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
(M/B)i t−1 -0.014 0.025 0.002 0.003* -0.000 0.008***
(0.013) (0.047) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Within R2 0.013 0.024 0.444 0.087 0.003 0.010
Table 7: Effects of Cash Flow, Cash Stock, and M/B on Investment, 1990 - 2015a
Source: first model is based on the author’s estimates of equation 3. Second model is based on a variant of that model. Both
models are based on a sample of firm data from Cornpustat database. See text.
a. The dependent variable is the investment-capital ratio (I/K)i t where I is investment in property, plant and equipment and
K is beginning-of-period capital stock. Equations are estimated with fixed firm, and year effects (not reported). The constant
is not reported. Cluster-robust standard errors appear in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. l.
b. Cash is defined as beginning-of-period cash and short-term securities. All other independent variables are as defined in
table 5, note b.
Independent variable and summary statisticb Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
Model including cash and short-term securities variable
(C F/K)i t -0.006 0.039*** -0.003
(0.009) (0.015) (0.003)
(Cash/K)i t−1 0.004 0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
(M/B)i t -0.001 0.007* 0.004**
(0.010) (0.004) (0.002)
Within R2 0.006 0.105 0.019
Model including sum of cash flow and stock variable
(C Fi t + Cashi t−1)/Ki t 0.002 0.003** -0.000
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
(M/B)i t 0.005 0.008** 0.004***
(0.008) (0.004) (0.002)
Within R2 0.002 0.077 0.005
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Table 8: Effects of Cash Flow, Safes, and M/B on Investment, 1990- 2015a
Source: first model is based on the author’s estimates of equation 4. Second model is based on equation 4 and includes
(M/B)i t Both models are based on a sample of firm data from Compustat database. See text.
a. The dependent variable is the investment-capital ratio (I/K)i t where I is investment in property, plant and equipment and
K is beginning-of-period capital stock. Equations are estimated with fixed firm, and year effects (not reported). The constant
is not reported. Cluster-robust standard errors appear in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.l.
b. (S/K)i t is the ratio of sales, S, to the beginning-of-period capital stock. All other independent variables are as defined in
table 5, note b.
Independent variable and summary statisticb Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
Model with sales-capital ratio
(C F/K)i t -0.017 -0.016 0.001
(0.017) (0.015) (0.001)
(S/K)i t 0.014 0.012** 0.004
(0.008) (0.006) (0.005)
(S/K)i t−1 -0.002 0.004 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
(S/K)i t−2 -0.001 -0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
(S/K)i t−3 -0.001 -0.003 0.000
(0.001) (0.004) (0.000)
Within R2 0.020 0.164 0.028
Model with sales-capital ratio and M/B
(CF/K);, -0.017 -0.016 0.001
(0.017) (0.015) (0.002)
(S/K)i t 0.013 0.012** 0.011
(0.008) (0.006) (0.007)
(S/K)i t−1 -0.001 0.004 -0.007
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007)
(S/K)i t−2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.011**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.005)
(S/K)i t−3 -0.001 -0.003 0.031**
(0.001) (0.004) (0.014)
(M/B)i t -0.006 0.009** 0.004**
(0.016) (0.004) (0.002)
Within R2 0.019 0.167 0.127
continues to generate controversy, it is sensible to compare
the findings of this paper with the ones by the parent of all
papers in this literature (Fazzari et al. (1988), p. 695).
While my approach is relatively close to that in Fazzari
et al. (1988), there could still be significant differences in
estimation results, inter alia, due to the following: first, Faz-
zari et al. (1988) use Value Line data, while I work with data
from Compustat. Second, many variables are defined differ-
ently. For example, they use three Q measures (Tobin’s q,
tax-adjusted Q with no dividends paid, tax-adjusted Q with
dividends paid), while I work with the simple M/B measure.
Also, FHP (Fazzari et al. (1988), pp. 193–194) employ a re-
placement value of the capital stock, estimated from book
values using a method similar to that of Salinger and Sum-
mers (1983), in contrast to the book value of net property,
plant, and equipment in this paper. The robustness section
(7.3) includes estimations based on cash flow defined with-
out subtracting dividends, like in Fazzari et al. (1988). Third,
as outlined above, it is plausible that financially distressed
firms exhibit low investment-cash flow sensitivities. In fact,
FHP (Fazzari et al. (1988), p. 158) intended to eliminate
distressed firms because they explicitly excluded firms with
overall negative real sales growth from their sample. Though
their results do not change substantially by including firms
with negative sales growth in the sample, the section on ro-
bustness includes model estimations that only incorporate
firm-year observations with positive sales growth. Fourth,
data in FHP (Fazzari et al. (1988), p. 191) are uninterrupted
from 1970–1984, while data in this paper are unbalanced
over 26 years from 1990–2015. Section 7.3 includes estima-
tions using a balanced panel as well. Fifth, estimations in
this paper work with cluster-robust standard errors, cluster-
ing over firms. Fazzari et al. (1988) could not yet do so.
Substantial differences in sample statistics, among other
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things because of the differences stated above, could impact
the findings. Naturally, differences in descriptive statistics
also exist because of mainly comparing mean values (FHP)
with median values (this paper). The median is preferred
over the mean, given that extreme values substantially im-
pact the summary statistics when these are based on mean
values. This paper is much more comprehensive with re-
gards to firm-year observations for each class. Apart from
that, many differences relate to the supposedly capital con-
strained class of firms, that is, class 1. For the vast majority of
these firms, in FHP (Fazzari et al. (1988), p. 159), the sales
growth is higher (13.7 percent vs. 8.4 percent), investment-
capital ratio is lower (0.26 vs. 0.94), and standard deviation
of the investment-capital ratio is lower (0.17 vs. 30.3). Re-
garding the cash flow-capital ratio, averages of the FHP sam-
ple are higher for the first class (0.3 vs. 0.2) and lower for
the second class (0.26 vs. 0.49) compared to the sample in
this paper, while standard deviations of that ratio are lower
for all classes in FHP, especially the first class (0.2 vs. 217.5)
and third class (0.06 vs. 21).
Four tables that summarize estimation results are com-
pared. The first estimation output is based on standard
equation 2, which augments the M/B investment model with
cash flow (see Fazzari et al. (1988), table 4). FHP find
that cash flow is significant in explaining CapEx across the
three classes, and its coefficient is significantly higher for the
high-retention sample. This paper presents findings (table
5) showing only statistical significance of the coefficient on
cash flow for the second class, translating into the single
specification in which a substantial portion of the variance
in investment is explained (0.425, for the first period). Both
papers see the deterioration of the cash flow effect over time,
having its root in lower asymmetric information.
The second regression results compared are based on
the basic equation 2, including either cash flow lags, or a
lagged market-to-book ratio. FHP (1988, table 6) show that
collinearity among cash flow variables reduces the impact of
the current cash flow variable in all classes when its lags are
included; the pattern, however, remains clear. The mostly
significant cash flow lags might well reflect shortcomings in
the empirical performance of Q, which is lower when lags of
cash flow are included. In contrast to that, this paper (table
6) finds that contemporaneous cash flow is robust to aug-
mentation with its lags, while the coefficient on M/B does
not change in all three classes. Both papers demonstrate
that the pattern of the cash flow coefficients across classes
for both time periods is virtually identical when the lagged
investment demand variable is included.
The third comparison is based on the investment-cash
stock model (equation 3), to which the cash flow variable is
added. Again, the contrast in results is obvious. FHP (1988,
table 10) find that the stock liquidity has a significant effect
on investment for the low-payout firms. The strong results
of the cash stock variable, which, in contrast to the flow of
liquidity, do not indicate much about the profitability of new
investment, are interpreted as strong evidence for the imper-
fect substitutability of internal and external finance at the
margin. However, I find (table 7) that cash stock is statisti-
cally and economically insignificant across the three classes
– a windfall for the hypothesis that there is no cost disadvan-
tage of external finance.
The last comparison uses estimations of equation 4, the
sales accelerator equation. FHP (1988, table 7) report that
most of the sales terms are statistically significant individ-
ually, with the effect of contemporaneous sales clearly be-
ing the strongest; cash flow coefficients decline in all three
classes when sales variables are added to the equation – any-
way, the cash flow pattern remains robust. When adding Q to
that, the pattern is still existent. Table 8 in this paper makes
clear that no coefficient on cash flow is significant any longer.
Instead, it is the correlation between cash flow and sales that
leads to significance of cash flow in class 2 in table 5. The
effect of contemporaneous sales is approximately equally sig-
nificant in economic terms across the three classes and sta-
tistically significant in the second class. The findings hold for
the estimation that includes M/B as well. The results indicate
that cash flow does not seem to represent an additional sup-
ply of low-cost investment finance for those firms that must
pay a premium for external capital.
7.2. Estimation Specifics
Table 9 presents the regression results of the basic equa-
tion 2, employing the ordinary least squares, fixed effects,
random effects, and first differences estimation methods. Re-
sults are reported for the entire sample period. I find that
across all tests, the pattern remains: robust statistical and
small economic significance of the coefficient on cash flow
is only present in the second class. Still, in class 2, there
are differences in the magnitudes of the cash flow coefficient
depending on the estimation method used. The magnitudes
of the coefficients vary from 0.02–0.057. I also find that, in
any payout class, the coefficient on M/B strongly depends on
the employed estimation method. For example, using OLS
in class 3, the coefficient on M/B is -0.006 (significant at the
five-percent level), while it is 0.006 (significant at the one-
percent level) using FE. Findings are approximately in line
with those in FHP (1988, table 5), who find that across all
estimation methods, differences in cash flow effects between
class 1 and class 3 remain remarkably consistent, while there
is clear variation in the magnitudes of M/B . Looking at the
class-2 coefficient on cash flow estimated by the RE technique
(0.032) in this paper, it gets clear that it is a bit closer to the
FE estimate (0.04) than to the OLS estimate (0.02). Thus,
the unobserved effect, αi , tends to be relatively important,
which is quite common in practice (Wooldridge (2013), p.
494).
As expected, table 9 also reveals that FE and FD estimates
might differ in ways that go beyond a sampling error, so that a
potential violation of the strict exogeneity assumption should
be considered. In absolute terms, estimation differences are
negligible (0.04 vs. 0.057). However, differences are around
43 percent. If ui t is correlated with x is for any t and s, FE and
FD generally have different probability limits. Simultaneity,
or any other standard endogeneity problem, generally causes
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Table 9: Effects of Cash Flow and M/B on Investment: Consideration of Measurement Error, 1990-2015a
Source: same like table 5.
a. The dependent variable is the investment-capital ratio (I/K)i t . All independent variables are as defined in table 5, note b.
The constant is not reported. Cluster-robust standard errors appear in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
b. Estimation includes year effects. All variables expressed as first differences. Estimation includes year effects.
Independent variable and
summary statistic
Ordinary least squares Fixed effectsb Random effects First differencec
Class 1
(C F/K)i t -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 -0.024
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.017)
(M/B)i t -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 0.008
(0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.021)
R2 0.003 0.004 0.0043 0.0123
Class 2
(C F/K)i t 0.020* 0.040*** 0.032*** 0.057**
(0.011) (0.015) (0.012) (0.024)
(M/B)i t 0.001 0.007* 0.004 0.013**
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
R2 0.022 0.104 0.0777 0.0387
Class 3
(C F/K)i t -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
(M/B)i t -0.006** 0.005*** -0.005* 0.006***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
R2 0.015 0.016 0.0184 0.0194
contemporaneous correlation, so that FE and FD are inconsis-
tent and have different probability limits. On top of that, cor-
relation between ui t and x is for s 6 t causes both, FD and FE,
to be inconsistent. For example, it is possible that the true ef-
fect of cash flow on physical investment is zero. But, if lagged
CapEx causes current cash flow, this would mean that high
lagged CapEx feeds back to high current cash flow. Hence,
the correlation between delta investment and delta cash flow
is negative and will yield a spurious negative-estimated cash
flow coefficient. However, the opposite seems to be true,
given that the cash flow coefficient estimated by first differ-
encing is more positive than the cash flow coefficient esti-
mated by fixed effects (Wooldridge (2010), pp. 284–285).
7.2.1. Choice of Estimation Method
In the investment-cash flow sensitivity literature, it is
standard to work with the fixed effects estimation method
(Brown and Petersen (2009), p. 972). However, given the fo-
cus on econometrics in this paper, several tests are conducted
to evaluate the appropriateness of the various estimation
methods. Table 10 presents the results of these tests. The
Chow test is a test of whether the coefficients estimated over
one group of the data are equal to the coefficients estimated
over another (Wooldridge (2013), p. 453). In this case, two
Chow tests are conducted. For the first test, the first group
of the data is the sub-sample of observations prior to the
dot-com bubble, while the second group is the sub-sample
after the dot-com bubble. That is, the structural break is
expected to have occurred right during the crisis. For the
second test, the break date is right during the financial crisis
of 2007–2008 (first group ex ante, second group ex post).
Diagnostic statistics are quite similar. Both tests reject the
null hypothesis of no structural change in the explanatory
variables at the five-percent significance level. This does not
come as a surprise, given that regression estimation results
are different in the respective sample periods (see tables
above, for example, table 5).
The next test is an F-test that serves to assess whether
the null hypothesis that firm effects are jointly zero can be
rejected. As the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, no firm
fixed effects are necessary – implying that the pooled OLS
method is sufficient to estimate equation 2. In contrast to
that, the two F-tests assessing the need of time effects re-
ject the null hypothesis that the time effects are jointly zero.
That is, no matter whether the classification scheme is ap-
plied (splitting the sample into the three payout-classes),
time fixed-effects are needed. In empirical research, it is
still fairly common to use FE and RE, and then formally test
for statistically significant differences in the coefficients on
the time-varying explanatory variables. Concretely, quite fre-
quently, the idea is that one uses RE unless the Hausman
test (Hausman (1978)) indicates that it is more appropri-
ate to use FE (Wooldridge (2013), p. 496). The Hausman
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(1978) test is based on the difference between the RE and
FE estimates. Since FE is consistent when αi and x i t j are
correlated, but RE is inconsistent, a statistically significant
difference is interpreted as evidence against the assumption
RE.2, i.e., Corr(x i t j , ai) = 0. Hence, the key consideration
in choosing between an RE and FE approach is whether αi
and x i t j are correlated.
When conducting the Hausman test, one should be aware
of two caveats. First, assumption FE.4, that is, strict exogene-
ity, is maintained under the null and the alternative. For any
s and t, correlation between ui t and x is causes both, FE and
RE, to be inconsistent – and generally their probability lim-
its will differ. The Hausman test is of no importance when
this assumption is violated. (This underlines the importance
of the strict exogeneity chapters (5.2.1, 5.2.2, and 7.2.2)
in this paper.) Second, implementation of the test assumes
that assumption RE.3, i.e., homoskedasticity, holds under the
null hypothesis. This assumption is not being tested by the
Hausman statistic. Violation of assumption RE.3 causes the
usual Hausman test to have a non-standard limiting distri-
bution, which means that the resulting test could have an
asymptotic size that is larger or smaller than the nominal
size (Wooldridge (2010), pp. 288–289). As table 10 re-
veals, the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis of an un-
systematic difference in the coefficients at the one-percent
level. Hence, the FE approach is preferred over the RE ap-
proach. In practice, a failure to reject means either that the
RE and FE estimates are sufficiently close so that it does not
matter which method is used, or practically significant dif-
ferences cannot be concluded to be statistically significant,
because the sampling variation in the FE estimates is too
large. In the latter case, one is left to wonder whether infor-
mation in the data are sufficient in order to provide precise
estimates of the coefficients (Wooldridge (2013), p. 496).
Finally, the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test is used
to decide between RE and simple OLS regression. It is a
test for heteroskedasticity across entities where the squared
OLS residuals are regressed on the explanatory variables in
equation 2 (Wooldridge (2013), p. 277). The test rejects
the null hypothesis that the variances across entities are zero
(homoskedastic) at the five-percent level. This implies that
there are significant differences across firms – and, hence,
there is a panel effect. All in all, tests make clear that FE
is preferred over RE (Hausman), RE is preferred over OLS
(Breusch-Pagan), but OLS is preferred over FE (F). Time fixed
effects should be included. Given these unclear test results,
economic intuition suggesting the use of FE, and the litera-
ture employing FE, firm and year FE is the preferred estima-
tion method in this paper.
7.2.2. Strict Exogeneity
As shown in section 7.2, when estimations are based on
the unbalanced panel, differences in cash flow estimates be-
tween FE and FD are in the order of almost 50 percent. On
top of that, when working with a balanced panel, differences
in estimates even increase. For example, in class 1, the FE
cash flow estimate is 0.075 (significant at ten percent level)
vs. FD estimate of 0.144 (significant at one percent level);
in class 2, coefficient on cash flow based on FE is 0.121 (sig-
nificant at five percent level), while the FD estimate is 0.064
and statistically insignificant. This can be seen as further ev-
idence in line with Grieser and Hadlock (2015). (The results
based on the balanced panel are not reported in any table;
the corresponding Stata commands can be found in the ap-
pendix.)
Table 11 presents the results of strict exogeneity tests
based on the FE transformation. As is standard in this the-
sis and following other tests for strict exogeneity, test statis-
tics are calculated with clustered standard errors at the firm
level to allow for arbitrary autocorrelation and heteroskedas-
ticity. When the test is for a model with cash flow as the
only selected explanatory variable, i.e., equation 12, magni-
tude and significance (but not signs) of the coefficients on
the one-period-ahead cash-flow variable are approximately
in line with the lagged cash-flow coefficients across payout
classes. For example, the coefficient on the cash-flow lag in
class 2 is 0.066 (one percent significance) and its one-step-
ahead counterpart has a magnitude of -0.04 (five percent sig-
nificance). This indicates violation of strict exogeneity. The
same is true when the equation is augmented with M/B and
its first lag. Results on the cash flow coefficients are basically
unchanged. The one-step-ahead M/B is insignificant in ev-
ery payout class; however, this is not a surprise, as its first
lag is economically insignificant as well. Still, controlling for
investment demand today, it makes intuitive sense that phys-
ical investment does feed back to tomorrow’s investment de-
mand. Exemplarily, due to promising investment opportuni-
ties today (high M/B ), capital is used to buy a new machine
(high CapEx). This new machine might cause better/more
investment opportunities tomorrow, even when controlling
for today’s investment demand. This is because this machine
could, inter alia, differentiate the company from its competi-
tors, so that it allows the company to take on projects it could
not do before. The test for the model with total investment
as the dependent variable does underline that the strict exo-
geneity assumption is not maintained. Clear significance of
contemporaneous cash flow for class-2 firms is evidence for
that. I use the total investment model for tests over the time
periods 1990–2002 and 2003–2015 as well. (Test results are
not reported in a table; Stata commands can be found in the
appendix, however.) The strict exogeneity assumption does
seem to hold over the smaller time periods 1 and 2. Contem-
poraneous cash flow coefficients are statistically insignificant
at the five-percent level. However, given the smaller sample
sizes involved in these tests, the p-values are generally some-
what higher than for the larger samples. Grieser and Hadlock
(2015) experience the same issue.
Table 12 is similar to table 11, except for the test results
being based on the FD transformation. The test on the first
(pure) cash flow model indicates that the coefficient on con-
temporaneous cash flow is not as significant as the coefficient
on the first-differenced cash-flow variable (if at all). Again,
the test for the full model, i.e., including M/B and its first
difference, does not impact effects of contemporaneous cash
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Table 10: Various Tests on Estimation Methods, 1990- 2015
Source: same like table 5.
a. Tests make use of equation 2.
Testa H0 Diagnostic statistics Probability Notes
Chow No structural change F = 3.04 0.028 Dot-com as break
Chow No structuralchange F = 3.17 0.023 Financial crisis as break
F Firm effects jointly zero F = 0.193 >0.1
F Firm effects jointly zero F = 3.49 0.000 With classification scheme
F Firm effectsjointly zero F = 1.52 0.05 Without classification scheme
Hausman Unsystematic difference in coefficients Chi-square = 34.11 0.000
Breusch-Pagan LM Homoskedasticity across entities Chi-square = 2.9 0.044
Table 11: Tests for Strict Exogeneity in FE: Various Specifications, 1990-2013a
Source: the three models are based on the author’s estimates of variations of equation 12.
a. The dependent variable is the first lag of the ratio of physical investment (total investment in the third model) to the
beginning-of-period stock of assets (capital in the third model). Equations are estimated with fixed firm and year effects (not
reported). The constant is not reported. Cluster-robust standard errors appear in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.
l.
b. (C F/K)i t−1 is the first lag of the ratio of cash flow, CF, to the beginning-of-period capital stock, K. (M/B)i t−1 is the first lag
of the market-to-book ratio. (C F/A)i t is the ratio of cash flow, CF, to the beginning-of-period asset stock, A. (C F/A)i t−1 is the
first lag of the ratio of cash flow, CF, to the beginning-of-period asset stock, A. (M/B)i t is defined like in table 5, note b.
Independent variable and summary statisticb Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
Test on key explanatory variable
(C F/K)i t 0.010* -0.040** 0.001
(0.006) (0.017) (0.001)
(C F/K)i t−1 -0.018* 0.066*** -0.003
(0.011) (0.023) (0.003)
Within R2 0.012 0.126 0.016
Test on standard full model
(C F/K)i t 0.010* -0.039** 0.001
(0.006) (0.017) (0.001)
(C F/K)i t−1 -0.017 0.066*** -0.003
(0.011) (0.023) (0.004)
(M/B)i t -0.009 0.001 -0.001
(0.009) (0.003) (0.002)
(M/B)i t−1 0.045 0.006 0.005***
(0.029) (0.005) (0.002)
Within R2 0.011 0.126 0.018
Test on model with total Investment as dependent variable
(C F/A)i t 0.030 0.132*** 0.080**
(0.026) (0.035) (0.040)
(C F/A)i t−1 -0.285** 0.185*** 0.230*
(0.140) (0.059) (0.120)
Within R2 0.271 0.311 0.121
flow and its first difference. Like with the FE transformation,
there does not seem to be feedback from the dependent vari-
able to the contemporaneous M/B variable. However, again,
the delta M/B effect is very small as well. Surprisingly, the
test for the total investment model leads to very high co-
efficients on cash flow in class 1; these coefficients are not
statistically significant though. When I test the total invest-
ment model for strict exogeneity in the sub-periods 1 and
2, contemporaneous cash flow coefficients are close to their
first-difference counterparts, including clearly significant co-
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efficients (again, results are not reported in a table; however,
the corresponding Stata commands can be found in the ap-
pendix). Still, given the general lack of significance of the
results of most variables presented in this table, it is difficult
– more difficult than for the FE transformation – to draw in-
ferences regarding the violation of strict exogeneity.
7.3. Robustness
Brown and Petersen (2009) have shown that a decline
in the relative importance of physical investment has led
to deterioration in the conventionally measured investment-
cash flow sensitivity. However, because R&D intensity has
risen strongly, they find that the sensitivity of investment to
cash flow remains relatively strong for investment into R&D.
The total investment-cash flow sensitivity has declined, but
is still significant. The authors argue that this broad invest-
ment measure is less subject to the problem of changing com-
position of investment expenditures than CapEx and might,
thus, be a more promising measure of the investment-cash
flow sensitivity and thereby a better proxy for financing con-
straints. This is why I estimate variations of equation 2 re-
garding the type of investments undertaken and the scaling
variable. The investment and cash flow variables are scaled
by total assets in order to have a common scale factor for all
regressions in this robustness check (and in some of the fol-
lowing). Results of these estimations are presented in table
13 for the entire sample period.
In the first model, the dependent variable is R&D expen-
diture. A sensitivity of R&D investment-cash flow is basically
not present. One could argue that this is because of a poten-
tial measurement error in the key variables, especially in cash
flow. This is because R&D is expensed and, as a consequence,
cash flow measures are net of R&D expenditures (Brown and
Petersen (2009), p. 975). But, when a gross cash flow mea-
sure, that is, cash flow with R&D added back, is employed
instead of the “standard” cash flow measure, estimation re-
sults are basically unchanged. This lack of significance is in
line with the findings of some of the recently written papers
in the investment-cash flow literature, such as Chen and Chen
(2012). They find that the sensitivity has declined and disap-
peared, even during the 2007–2009 credit crunch – and their
results are robust to considerations of R&D.
In the second model, total investment is regressed on cash
flow and the market-to-book ratio. The class-1 cash flow co-
efficient is, with -0.304, economically significant, but statis-
tically significant only at the ten-percent level; cash flow is
strongly significant for class-2 firms. Compared with that,
when physical investment is the dependent variable (third
model), the cash flow pattern resembles that of the second
estimation, but is less pronounced.
This third model serves as a robustness check to the find-
ings presented in table 5, as well as a comparison to the first
two models discussed above. Estimation results are differ-
ent to those with normalizations by capital stock in that the
class-1 cash flow coefficient is significantly negative, while
the second-class cash flow coefficient is more positive. When
using the sales accelerator specification instead of M/B to
capture the investment demand side, magnitudes of the co-
efficients on cash flow across the payout classes generally in-
crease in all three equations. The only exception is the to-
tal investment equation, in which the class-2 coefficient on
cash flow is no longer significant. (These results are not re-
ported in any table; the corresponding Stata commands can
be found in the appendix.)
Cornell and Shapiro (1988) have shown that R&D-
intensive firms use little debt, inter alia, due to the poor
collateral value of R&D and the fact that debt finance can
lead to financial distress, which is especially severe for R&D-
intensive companies. As a consequence, R&D investment by
young firms, especially those with low or negative cash flows,
may be heavily dependent on the availability of public equity
finance. In addition to that, as explained above, a failure to
control for external finance in the investment equation can
lead to a downward omitted variable bias due to the corre-
lation of external finance with cash flow, especially for those
firms that make heavy use of stock issues. Therefore, I check
the robustness of this paper’s findings by estimating equation
2, augmented by two external finance variables. These two
external finance variables cover the equity and the debt side.
Also, given the substantial theoretical importance of external
(equity) finance for R&D-intensive firms, the R&D and total
investment models presented above are augmented by the
external finance variables as well.
Findings of the estimations over the total sample period
are presented in table 14. The equation with R&D invest-
ment as the dependent variable does not undergo a signif-
icant change in the cash flow coefficients when the model
includes external finance variables. It is against the outlined
economic theory that public equity finance does not play a
role for class-1 firms. Instead, long-term debt issuance is
clearly relevant in explaining R&D investment for this sub-
sample of firms. The downward omitted variable bias does
not seem to be present in the data. When total investment
is regressed on cash flow, M/B , and external finance, the
second-class cash flow coefficient is less significant in explain-
ing total investment than without external finance, but the
pattern remains. Stock issuance does play a significant role,
especially for class-2 firms. Its impact on cash flow is am-
biguous, as the coefficient on cash flow is lower in the sec-
ond class, while it is higher in the third class. For the third
model and compared with table 5, the cash flow pattern is
quite robust to the augmentation by external finance, while
external finance generally has power in explaining variations
in CapEx.
One purpose of this paper is to use the approach in
Fazzari et al. (1988) and analyze how their findings have
changed using the more current set of data (and method-
ology, e.g., clustering). A potential impact factor for the de-
viation in results from those in Fazzari et al. (1988) could be
different definitions of key variables, as outlined above. In or-
der to see whether findings are robust to different definitions
of some variables that more closely resemble those used in
Fazzari et al. (1988), sales accelerator and cash flow are de-
fined differently. Sales accelerator, that is, sales plus finished
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Table 12: Tests for Strict Exogeneity in FD: Various Specifications, 1990-2015a
Source: the three models are based on the author’s estimates of variations of equation 12.
a. The dependent variable is the first difference of the ratio of physical investment (total investment in the third model) to
the beginning-of-period stock of assets (capital in the third model ). Estimation includes year effects. The constant is not
reported. Clusterrobust standard errors appear in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
b. ∆ denotes first-differenced variables. All independent variables are as defined in table 11, note b.
Independent variable and summary statisticb Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
Test on key explanatory variable
∆(C F/K)i t -0.028* 0.054** -0.004
(0.016) (0.024) (0.004)
(C F/K)i t 0.006 0.005* 0.000
(0.010) (0.003) (0.000)
Within R2 0.016 0.056 0.02
Test on standard full model
∆(C F/K)i t -0.027 0.055** -0.004
(0.017) (0.024) (0.005)
(C F/K)i t 0.005 0.005* 0.000
(0.010) (0.003) (0.000)
∆(M/B)i t 0.021 0.010* 0.006**
(0.034) (0.005) (0.003)
(M/B)i t -0.016 0.001 0.000
(0.032) (0.000) (0.000)
Within R2 0.015 0.059 0.023
Test on model with total investment as dependent variable
∆(C F/A)i t 0.973 0.020 -0.007
(0.662) (0.042) (0.057)
(C F/A)i t -0.950 0.074* -0.020
(0.674) (0.039) (0.080)
Within R2 0.227 0.036 0.017
goods inventory, is employed as an independent variable in-
stead of sales. Cash flow is defined without subtracting div-
idends – assuming that sticky dividends play a smaller role.
In both specifications, results are basically indistinguishable
from those with the “standard” set of variables, undermining
the possibility that the different findings are, among other
things, due to a different set of variables.
Another robustness check refers to clustering, which is
relatively new, so that Fazzari et al. (1988) could not make
use of it yet. When employing default standard errors in-
stead of the cluster-robust version, the failure to control for
within-cluster correlation leads to misleadingly small stan-
dard errors, narrow confidence intervals, large t-statistics,
and low p-values. When working with cluster-robust stan-
dard errors instead, it does not matter too much what to
cluster over. This is because there is basically no difference in
the standard errors when they are clustered over firms com-
pared with clustering over industries. As explained above, all
outputs presented in this paper are based on standard errors
that are clustered over firms. A different issue is financial
distress. Financially distressed firms may experience lower
investment-cash flow sensitivities. Coefficients are basically
unchanged when all firm-year observations are excluded in
which sales growth was not positive. Thus, findings are ro-
bust to trying to eliminate distressed firms (or firm-year ob-
servations during which companies were struggling). This is
in line with Fazzari et al. (1988) who only work with compa-
nies that had grown their sales, but find that results do not
change significantly when negative-sales-growth firms are in-
cluded. Excluding some distressed firms this way is comple-
mentary to balancing the panel, which omits some financially
distressed firms as well. (The results presented in this para-
graph are not reported in any table; the corresponding Stata
commands can be found in the appendix.)
A final issue is the potential discrepancy due to working
with an unbalanced panel, as compared to working with a
balanced panel, such as in Fazzari et al. (1988) among oth-
ers. The mechanics of FE estimation with an unbalanced
and a balanced panel are basically the same. If Ti is the
number of time periods for cross-sectional unit i, one sim-
ply uses these Ti observations in doing the time-demeaning.
Like in the balanced panel case, one degree of freedom is lost
for every cross-sectional observation due to time-demeaning.
However, the reason for an unbalanced panel, among other
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Table 13: Effects of Cash Flow and M/B on Physical, R&D, and Total Investment, 1990-2015a
Source: the three models are based on the author’s estimates of variations of equation 2.
a. The dependent variable is the ratio of some form of investment to the beginning-of period stock of assets. It is investments
in R&D in the first mode l, investments in physical assets plus R&D in the second mode l, and investments in physical assets
in the third model. Equations are estimated with fixed firm and year effects (not reported). The constant is not reported.
Cluster-robust standard errors appear in parentheses. *** p<0.01,** p<0.05, * p<0.l.
b. (C F/A)i t is the ratio of cash flow, CF, to the beginning-of-period asset stock. (M/B)i t is defined in table 5, note b.
Independent variable and summary statisticb Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
Model with R&D investment as dependent variable
(C F/A)i t -0.038* 0.059 -0.097
(0.022) (0.045) (0.061)
(M/B)i t 0.114 -0.000 -0.000
(0.077) (0.001) (0.000)
Within R2 0.336 0.095 0.178
Model with total investment as dependent variable
(C F/A)i t -0.304* 0.229*** -0.032
(0.171) (0.068) (0.094)
(M/B)i t -0.074 0.001 0.001
(0.151) (0.002) (0.001)
Within R2 0.278 0.311 0.118
Model with physical investment as dependent variable
(C F/A)i t -0.163** 0.198*** -0.020
(0.083) (0.041) (0.028)
(M/B)i t -0.107** 0.003* 0.002***
(0.051) (0.001) (0.001)
Within R2 0.145 0.283 0.054
things, can be that data in advanced years do no longer in-
clude those firms that have gone out of business or merged
with other firms. This can be problematic if the reason a
firm leaves the sample (attrition) is correlated with the id-
iosyncratic error, i.e., those unobserved factors that change
over time and affect investment spending. A resulting non-
random sample can cause biased estimators. Nevertheless,
fixed effects analysis is useful here, as it allows attrition to
be correlated with αi , the unobserved effect (Wooldridge
(2013), p. 491). Also, attrition bias should not be a substan-
tial issue here, given that the classification scheme requires
companies to have firm-year observations, i.e., to be active,
over the majority of the sample period.
The classification scheme might also (partially) impede
an effect of balancing the panel on the firms’ degree of asym-
metric information (and thereby investment-cash flow sensi-
tivities): as firms mature and more observations of project re-
alizations and balance sheets become available, asymmetric
information problems should become less severe. It is strik-
ing that when comparing descriptive statistics between the
balanced and the unbalanced panel, the number of obser-
vations is much lower (approximately factor of ten), there
are much lower standard deviations of sales growth (approx-
imately factor of 50 for class 1), investment-capital ratio, and
cash flow-capital ratio, and there is less of a difference be-
tween mean and median values of capital stock and M/B .
These differences are likely to impact the estimation results,
which are presented in table 15, and serve as an important
test to see whether the very high standard deviations of key
variables in the unbalanced case harm the credibility of the
estimation results. Table 15 is just like table 5, except that
the estimation is based on a balanced panel. Interestingly, the
cash flow coefficient on class 1 is significant over 2003–2015,
while economic theory would suggest it is more significant
over 1990–2002 (asymmetric information). The balanced
panel might show significant cash flow effects of the low-
payout firms because financially distressed firms that went
out of business or merged during the sample period were en-
tirely omitted from the estimation – and were not omitted
due to the classification scheme already. The class-2 coeffi-
cient on cash flow is more significant over 1990–2015 than
in the unbalanced case. For the third class, the cash flow co-
efficient is still not economically significant. When different
estimation methods are employed (just like in table 9), the
cash flow pattern generally remains: a small effect in class 1,
a more significant effect in class 2, and no effect in class 3.
Only the FD estimation is slightly different in that the class-
1 cash flow effect is more pronounced (0.144, significance
at the one-percent level), while the class-2 coefficient is in-
significant. In addition, just like in the case with an unbal-
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Table 14: Effects of Cash Flow, M/B, and Externat Finance on Physical, R&D, and Total Investment, 1990-2015a
Source: the three models are based on the author’s estimates of variations of equation 2.
a. The dependent variable is the ratio of some form of investment to the beginning-of period stock of assets (capital in the
third model). It is investments in R&D in the first model, investments in physical assets plus R&D in the second model, and
investments in physical assets in the third model. Equations are estimated with fixed firm and year effects (not reported). The
constant is not reported. Cluster-robust standard errors appear in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p<0.l.
b. (C F/A)i t is the ratio of cash flow, CF, to the beginning-of-period asset stock, A. (CST/A)i t is the ratio of commons hare s
iss ued, CST, to beginning-of-period total assets. (LT D/A)i t is defined as the measure of the issuance of long-term debt, LTD,
scaled by total assets at the beginning of the period. All other independent variables are as defined in table 5, note b.
Independent variable and summary statisticb Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
Model with R&D investment as dependent variable
(C F/A)i t -0.032* 0.017 -0.010
(0.019) (0.054) (0.023)
(CST/A)i t -0.000 0.110 0.007***
(0.000) (0.072) (0.001)
(LT D/A)i t 0.228*** 0.028* -0.000**
(0.077) (0.015) (0.000)
(M/B)i t 0.122 -0.000 0.000
(0.075) (0.001) (0.000)
Within R2 0.393 0.180 0.506
Model with total investment as dependent variable
(C F/A)i t -0.296* 0.142* 0.095*
(0.171) (0.072) (0.056)
(CST/A)i t 0.000 0.367*** 0.011***
(0.000) (0.096) (0.002)
(LT D/A)i t 0.171 0.039* 0.000
(0.332) (0.021) (0.001)
(M/B)i t -0.075 0.004** 0.002**
(0.152) (0.002) (0.001)
Within R2 0.280 0.387 0.250
Model with physical investment as dependent variable
(C F/K)i t -0.001 0.024** -0.002**
(0.007) (0.011) (0.001)
(CST/A)i t 0.000 0.224** 0.004***
(0.000) (0.100) (0.001)
(LT D/A)i t 0.176*** 0.002*** -0.002***
(0.047) (0.001) (0.000)
(M/B)i t -0.001 0.011* 0.008***
(0.010) (0.006) (0.002)
Within R2 0.609 0.167 0.608
anced panel, when working with the acceleration principle to
construct a model’s investment demand side, cash flow coef-
ficients are no longer significant in any payout class. This
also means that, when working with the unbalanced panel,
the high standard deviations of key variables (e.g., cash flow-
capital ratio) do not substantially impact the estimation re-
sults. (The descriptive statistics, the results of the different
estimation methods, and the results of the sales accelerator
specification are not reported; the corresponding Stata com-
mands can be found in the appendix.)
8. Conclusion
The sample in this study consists of annual data of US in-
dustrial firms between 1990 and 2015. I use Fazzari et al.
(1988) as a guidance and comparison and analyze what has
changed. I augment their research design with the find-
ings from influential, other papers in the literature. In ad-
dition to that, throughout this paper, I focus on the econo-
metrics involved, making this paper one of the first empiri-
cal finance papers to explicitly acknowledge and analyze the
strict exogeneity assumption. The literature demonstrates
that the investment-cash flow sensitivity has decreased over
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Table 15: Effects of Cash Flow and M/B on Investment, Various Periods, Balanced Panel, 1990- 2015a
Source: author’s estimates of equation 2 based on a sample of firm data from Compustat database. See text.
a. The dependent variable is the investment-capital ratio (I/K)i t where I is investment in property, plant and equipment
and K is beginning-of-period capital stock. All independent variables are as defined in table 5, note b. The equations were
estimated using fixed firm and year effects (not reported). The constant is not reported. Cluster robust standard errors appear
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. l.
Independent variable and summary statistic Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
1990-2002
(C F/K)i t 0.001* 0.044** -0.001***
(0.001) (0.017) (0.000)
(M/B)i t 0.004 0.015*** 0.004
(0.009) (0.005) (0.003)
Within R2 0.032 0.147 0.223
2003- 2015
(C F/K)i t 0.100*** 0.014 0.010
(0.016) (0.038) (0.009)
(M/B)i t 0.038 0.002 -0.009***
(0.047) (0.003) (0.003)
Within R2 0.274 0.075 0.029
1990-2015
(C F/K)i t 0.075* 0.121** -0.001***
(0.038) (0.056) (0.000)
(M/B)i t 0.028 0.006 -0.001
(0.024) (0.007) (0.003)
Within R2 0.175 0.214 0.195
time. This literature is also not without criticism. For ex-
ample, some researchers criticize the conventional regression
equations used, while others doubt that these equations serve
as adequate measures of financing constraints. Given that
much remains unsolved, the topic of financing constraints
and investment-cash flow is still a vivid research field – and
one of the largest in corporate finance. It is recently also
being broadened. Finally, the literature section shows that
testing for the violation of the strict exogeneity assumption
in empirical panel data finance research is of critical impor-
tance.
Revisiting the hypotheses a, b, and c, this paper presents
evidence that the investment-cash flow sensitivity has de-
creased and (mostly) disappeared over time. For that, I use
two of the broad empirical specifications that encompass the
most common approaches of constructing models’ invest-
ment demand side: models based on the M/B ratio, as well
as models based on the sales accelerator. The estimation
results basically do not change, no matter whether the M/B
model is augmented with cash flow, with cash flow lags and
lagged M/B ratios on top of that, or with cash stock in ad-
dition to cash flow. The sales accelerator model consists of
three lags of sales, augmented with cash flow. An alternative
specification adds M/B to that. When the sales accelerator
specification is used instead of M/B , there is no significant
cash flow coefficient in any class. This suggests that the pre-
vious significance in class 2 is due to correlation of cash flow
and sales. The results are also robust to employing different
estimation methods, namely OLS, FE, RE, and FD. Depending
on which of the estimation methods is used, magnitudes of
the cash flow coefficient in equation 2 vary from 0.02–0.057.
While the differences in absolute terms are negligible, the
differences in, for example, FE and FD estimates are in the
order of nearly 50 percent. Given this difference – which
is even more pronounced when estimations are based on a
balanced panel instead of an unbalanced panel –, I suspect
that estimation differences are driven by the violation of the
strict exogeneity assumption. (This is confirmed in explicit
strict exogeneity tests, so that hypothesis e is not rejected.)
The magnitude of the difference also suggests that the in-
consistency caused by the violation of the assumption can
be substantial (hypothesis f). Coefficients on M/B strongly
depend on the choice of the estimation method.
In order to choose the optimal estimation method for the
purposes of this research, I conduct several tests. Their re-
sults are ambiguous. FE is preferred over RE (Hausman test),
RE is preferred over OLS (Breusch-Pagan test), but OLS is
preferred over FE (F test). However, given that economic in-
tuition suggests the use of FE and given that the literature
mostly employs FE, firm and year FE is the preferred estima-
tion method in this paper (hypothesis d). My results are un-
changed in substance when the following robustness checks
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are conducted: consideration of a changing composition of
investment, consideration of the impact of external finance,
different definitions of variables, various forms of clustering,
exclusion of firm-years with negative sales growth, and es-
timations based on a balanced panel. Hence, evidence on a
lack of significance of the sensitivity of investment to cash
flow stands in stark contrast to the findings in . However, my
evidence is in line with many recent papers (e.g., Chen and
Chen (2012)).
This paper contributes to the literature by being an addi-
tional piece of evidence that the investment-cash flow sensi-
tivity has decreased over time (and disappeared) – robust to
a number of alternative specifications and robustness checks.
In addition to that, it presents further evidence that the strict
exogeneity assumption is quite commonly violated in empir-
ical panel data finance research and that this violation can
cause a substantial distortion in results.
This paper offers me a great gain in knowledge in empiri-
cal finance research, panel data estimation methods, and the
use of Stata – and, hence, serves as a good preparation for
my doctoral studies. However, the conclusions drawn in this
paper do not come without caveats. Estimations are mainly
based on an unbalanced panel. Descriptive statistics show
very large standard deviations in sales growth, investment-
capital ratio, and cash flow-capital ratio, especially for class-1
firms. This is worrying, as outliers can undermine the cred-
ibility of estimation results. However, I drop the two obser-
vations with a Cook’s distance greater one. Then, estimation
results of OLS are very close to those of a robust regression.
Furthermore, descriptive statistics of the payout classes show
much lower standard deviations in the case of a balanced
panel. Estimation results based on a balanced panel are ap-
proximately in line with the ones based on an unbalanced
panel. This should indicate that the presented evidence is
not impacted by outlier problems.
The same arguments can be applied against the criticism
on employing a splitting criterion that sorts firms into sub-
samples with differential outliers in growth rates, which can
lead to finding a difference in the coefficients on cash flow.
Therefore, dividend payouts as a broad splitting criterion are
no longer without controversy. In line with that is that some
recent papers use more direct proxies for capital market im-
perfections and financial constraints. For example, Chowd-
hury et al. (2016) use the bid-ask spread measure of infor-
mation asymmetry. This measure is generally accepted in the
market microstructure literature and might improve upon the
broad proxy of dividend payout rates used in this paper. An-
other drawback of this paper is the theoretical ambiguity re-
garding the economic interpretations of some variables pre-
sented throughout this study. For example, a firm’s high cash
stock can either signal that the firm has done well and is likely
to continue doing well (thus, more liquid firms have better in-
vestment opportunities), or it means that a constrained firm
hoards cash to protect against future downturns. This would
then be a signal for poor performance.
With regards to the outline for future research, I can say
that there is still room for research in areas in which financial
constraints possibly play a role. Exemplarily, further research
can be conducted on the efficiency of internal capital mar-
kets, the effect of agency on firm policies, and the influence
of managerial characteristics. There is ongoing interest in the
study of the relationship between investment and cash flow
because of the importance of firm and aggregate investment
and because of continuing innovation regarding alternative
investment-cash flow regression equations, measures of fi-
nancing constraints, usage of exogenous shocks, etc. These
innovations can shed additional light on the issue of financ-
ing constraints. Also, research can try to work around the
theoretical ambiguity of variables. Finally, econometrics can
play a larger role, for example, by using dynamic instead of
static models.
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